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Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation:
Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies
Lawrence A. Hamermesh and Michael L. Wachter1
Abstract
This article examines the evolution of Delaware appraisal litigation and concludes that
recent precedents have created a satisfactory framework in which the remedy is most effective in
the case of transactions where there is the greatest reason to question the efficacy of the market
for corporate control, and vice versa. We suggest that, in effect, the developing framework
invites the courts to accept the deal price as the proper measure of fair value, not because of any
presumption that would operate in the absence of proof, but where the proponent of the
transaction affirmatively demonstrates that the transaction would survive judicial review under
the enhanced scrutiny standard applicable to fiduciary duty-based challenges to sales of
corporate control. We also suggest, however, that the courts and expert witnesses should and are
likely to refine the manner in which elements of value (synergies) should, as a matter of wellestablished law, be deducted from the deal price to arrive at an appropriate estimate of fair
value.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Facilitated largely by “appraisal arbitrage” – the practice of purchasing shares of stock

after announcement of a merger, with a view to exercising the statutory right to an award of “fair
value” in lieu of the merger price – the once-discredited appraisal remedy has become a
significant phenomenon in shareholder litigation.2 That development has generated competing
claims that appraisal arbitrage should be prohibited because it unduly deters bids, or should be
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encouraged as an incentive to bidders to pay fair value.3 Increased use of the appraisal remedy
has also engendered a parallel debate about the role of the merger price in determining fair value:
one school of thought posits that the merger price (or deal price) should presumptively be taken
to reflect fair value; the opposing school holds that such a “market price rule” harms target
company stockholders and should be rejected.4
We submit that the Delaware courts are developing a middle ground point of view with
respect to these parallel debates. On one hand, the courts have continued to affirm that the
practice of appraisal arbitrage is legally permissible under the governing statutory framework,
and the Delaware legislature has done nothing to undermine that view.5 On the other hand, the
courts’ increasing reliance on the deal price to measure fair value has undoubtedly circumscribed
the incentive to engage in appraisal arbitrage, at least in cases in which such reliance is most
likely to occur.6
We support this middle ground point of view, and suggest two significant refinements
that would clarify the operation of the appraisal remedy. First, we suggest that the Delaware
courts’ treatment of the use of the deal price to determine fair value does and should mirror the
treatment of shareholder class action fiduciary duty litigation. In the case of a sale of corporate
control, in which the Delaware statute affords appraisal rights,7 the governing standard of
judicial review requires “enhanced scrutiny” to determine the reasonableness of the sale
process.8 That same form of judicial review could usefully be applied to determine when the deal

3

See Part II.B below.
See Part III.B.2.a below
5
See Part II.A below.
6
See Part III.B.1.c below.
7
Tit. 8, DEL. CODE ANN., § 262 (“Section 262”).
8
E.g., QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, 635 A.2d 1245, 1268 n. 44 (Del. 1993)
(“The enhanced scrutiny required by Revlon [Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
4
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price should be used to measure fair value: where the proponents of the deal satisfy that form of
review, such use of the deal price is appropriate; and where they don’t, it’s not.9
Second, we further suggest that reliance on the deal price, without further inquiry,
inappropriately creates a no-lose proposition for appraisal arbitrage.10 It also fails to give effect
to well-settled judicial interpretation of the appraisal statute, under which elements of value
reflected in the deal price must be deducted to arrive at fair value if they involve value
(synergies) that can be achieved only as a result of the merger.11 Case law and finance literature
are sparse, however, in their treatment and quantification of an appropriate deduction for
synergies, and we suggest that refinement of that treatment is likely, as deal price comes to play
a more regular role in the establishment of fair value.
We develop the foregoing suggestions in the following manner. In Part II, we describe
the growth of appraisal arbitrage and the use of the appraisal remedy, and we briefly recount and
comment on the debate about the utility of appraisal arbitrage. In Part III, we begin with
consideration of a possible statutory change to address concerns about appraisal arbitrage, but
find that approach impractical and unlikely to occur. We then consider an approach involving
refinement of the standards for determining fair value in appraisal litigation. In that regard, we
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)] imposes upon the directors the burden of showing the reasonableness of
their conduct.”).
9
Where the proponent of the transaction fails to establish the reasonableness of the sale process,
it may still be appropriate for the court to take the deal price into account in some manner, such
as a corroborative check on the results of other valuation techniques. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of
Dell, Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, *148 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Dell, Inc. v.
Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., [2017 Del. LEXIS 518,] _ A.3d __ (Del.
2017) (“The market data is sufficient to exclude the possibility, advocated by the petitioners'
expert, that the Merger undervalued the Company by $23 billion”).
10
“No-lose” is admittedly a loose characterization: legal and expert witness fees must usually be
borne by dissenting stockholders, and may or may not exceed the benefit of relatively high prejudgment interest on what is essentially an intermediate duration debt claim against the
corporation surviving the merger. See text at notes [170-171] below.
11
See Part IV.A below.
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review the evolution of the role of deal price and the parallel evolution of the use of discounted
cash flow (DCF) analysis in appraisal litigation. We then briefly outline the academic debate
about the relative merits of these two valuation approaches, including the debate about the
possibility of a “market price rule” in which deal price is presumptively determinative of fair
value. We conclude Part III with an assessment of the standards by which the courts do and
should take deal price into account in determining fair value.
In Part IV, we review how the courts in appraisal litigation have addressed the treatment
of synergistic elements of value in the deal price. Acknowledging the legal proposition that such
elements must be excluded in determining fair value, we next review how such elements ought to
be identified. At that point, we review possible approaches for determining the extent of such
synergistic gains, and for determining how such gains might be allocated between acquirers and
target company stockholders. We conclude Part IV with the observation that these approaches to
synergies are not fully developed in the case law or finance literature, and suggest that law and
finance practitioners and the Delaware courts are likely to devote increased attention to refining
those approaches.

II.

APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE: HISTORY AND CRITIQUES
A.

The Legal Framework for, and Growth of, Appraisal Arbitrage

Although the Delaware appraisal statute is not altogether explicit on the point, it has long
been recognized that someone who buys shares after the announcement of the terms of a merger
is nonetheless entitled to seek appraisal with respect to those shares – i.e., engage in “appraisal
arbitrage” – as long as the person complies with the formal requirements of the appraisal

4
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statute.12 Although this recognition is frequently traced back to the Transkaryotic opinion in
2007, the Delaware Court of Chancery first acknowledged the right of post-announcement
purchasers to seek appraisal nearly twenty years earlier.13
The practice of engaging in appraisal arbitrage did not emerge on a large scale, however,
until after 2007, but when it did, the previously inhospitable and relatively rarely used appraisal
remedy became a hot litigation commodity: as vividly illustrated by a bar graph presented by
Subramanian, “appraisal has gone from a trickle in 2009 to approximately $2.0 billion in face
value of claims in each of 2015 and 2016.”14 Much of this growth has been driven by specialized
players in the appraisal arbitrage field, one of whom (Merion Capital) by itself accounted for
36% of the face value of all appraisal claims during the measurement period (2009-2016).15
B.

The Appraisal Arbitrage Debate

The phenomenon of appraisal arbitrage has generated considerable controversy, which
we review here only briefly. Some of the criticism of the practice takes an almost morals-based
tone. Early on, it was argued that the practice was inequitable, much like the purchase of stock to

12

In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del. Ch. May 2,
2007).
13
Salomon Bros., Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 576 A.2d 650 (Del. Ch. 1989); cf. Guhan
Subramanian, Using Deal Price to Determine “Fair Value” in Appraisal Proceedings, at 2,
available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/20170206_Subramaniandraft_9aa5b475-ed61-4fae-8b39-9b2de9d09425_78008941-390f-458a-a0e0-92863f300dc8.pdf
(Transkaryotic “opened the way for appraisal arbitrage”). One of the authors represented
Salomon Brothers in this case. Transkaryotic addressed and rejected one argument not raised in
Interstate Bakeries, namely the claim that a post-announcement purchaser should be required to
demonstrate that its shares, held in fungible bulk in the name of a depository nominee, were not
voted in favor of the merger.
14
Subramanian, note [ ] above, at 2.
15
Id. at 10.
5
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bring a derivative suit based on a preexisting wrong to the corporation.16 According to seven
highly respected corporate law firms, the practice of appraisal arbitrage is downright
“unseemly.”17 Conversely, criticism of appraisal arbitrage invokes the claim – consistently
rejected by the Delaware courts – that appraisal rights were intended only for the benefit of preannouncement holders, and should not be construed to extend to post-announcement
purchasers.18 In response to these legal or moral arguments, supporters of appraisal arbitrage
argue that purchasing shares after the deal is announced, in order to exercise appraisal rights, is
no more unseemly or inequitable than widely accepted practices of trading other financial or
contractual claims.19 Those supporters have consistently won the formal legal argument, with the

16

Salomon Brothers, 576 A.2d at 653-654 (respondent “contends that Salomon's position is the
same as that of a stockholder who attempts to bring a derivative suit complaining of wrongs that
pre-date the stockholder's first purchase of stock.”).
17
Letter to the Council of the Delaware State Bar Association Corporation Law Section, from
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Latham & Watkins LLP, Skadden
Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,
and Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, Apr. 1, 2015, available at [] (denying appraisal rights to
post-announcement purchasers “would … reduce the unseemly claims-buying that is rampant
and serves no legitimate equitable or other purpose, but threatens to undermine transactional
certainty and reduce value to shareholders of Delaware corporations as acquirers, particularly in
leveraged transactions, may be forced to factor the enhanced appraisal risk into their
calculations.").
18
Richard A. Booth, The Real Problem With Appraisal Arbitrage, 72 BUS. LAW. 325 (2017)
(“the appraisal remedy is widely seen as intended to protect existing stockholders who are (or
will be) forced to sell their shares in the merger”); Salomon Brothers, 576 A.2d at 651-652
(“IBC's primary argument is that the appraisal statute was not designed to protect those who wish
to speculate on a judicial remedy and that Salomon acted in bad faith by purchasing shares with
notice of the merger and then demanding appraisal. … Th[e] history of our appraisal statute does
not support IBC's argument that the statute was designed to protect only those stockholders who
purchased their shares prior to the announcement of a merger. Rather, its purpose was to replace
the stockholder's veto power with a means of withdrawing from the company at a judicially
determined price.”).
19
Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association, Explanatory
Paper (Mar. 16, 2015), at 2, available at
https://www.lowenstein.com/files/upload/DGCL%20262%20Proposal%203-615%20Explanatory%20Paper.pdf (“The assignment and acquisition of financial claims (in
contrast to tort claims) generally has been accepted historically and presently as lawful and
6
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courts holding that the words and history of the appraisal statute support the practice of appraisal
arbitrage.20 In sum, we see no basis in existing statutes or precedent to conclude that appraisal
arbitrage offends some well-established moral or legal precept.
Other criticisms of appraisal arbitrage rely more on economic analysis. It has been
suggested, for example, that appraisal arbitrageurs unfairly benefit from a “free option” to take
advantage of information arising after the announcement of the deal.21 Critics also contend that

consistent with public policy.”), citing 6 Del. C. § 2702 (assignees of bonds, specialties and notes
may enforce in their own name); 10 Del. C. § 3902 (assignees of contracts may enforce in their
own name); Lauren D. Gojkovich, Leveraging Litigation: How Shareholders Can Use Litigation
Leverage to Double Down on Their Investment in High Stakes Securities Litigation, 16 STAN.
L.J. BUS. & FIN.100, 111 (2010). See also Eric Winston, Understanding The Reasons Traders
Buy Bankruptcy Claims, Law 360 (Jan. 8, 2014), available at
https://www.law360.com/articles/498711/understanding-the-reasons-traders-buy-bankruptcyclaims (“it is common in ‘mega’ Chapter 11 cases to see on the docket hundreds, if not
thousands, of ‘claims transfer notices’ filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
3001(e), and that is only a small set of the claims trading activity.”).
20
Salomon Brothers, 576 A.2d at 652 (“If appraisal rights were granted as the quid pro quo for
the loss of veto power, there is no apparent reason why all stockholders who formerly could have
exercised that veto power should not now be able to exercise appraisal rights”); Transkaryotic,
2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 at *10-11 (“Must a beneficial shareholder, who purchased
shares after the record date but before the merger vote, prove, by documentation, that each newly
acquired share (i.e., after the record date) is a share not voted in favor of the merger by
the previous beneficial shareholder? The answer seems simple. No. Under the literal terms of the
statutory text and under longstanding Delaware Supreme Court precedent, only a record holder,
as defined in the DGCL, may claim and perfect appraisal rights. Thus, it necessarily follows that
the record holder's actions determine perfection of the right to seek appraisal.”).
21
Gaurav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage—Is There a Delaware Advantage?, 71 BUS.
LAW. 427, 433-441 (2016); Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act to Curb
Appraisal Arbitrage Abuses, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 10, 2015), available at
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/02/10/delaware-legislature-should-act-to-curbappraisal-arbitrage-abuses/ (“the fact that the relevant appraisal valuation date is the closing of a
transaction, rather than the time of announcement of the deal or the shareholder vote … gives the
appraisal arbitrageur a free option on positive developments between signing and closing.”); New
Activist Weapon – The Rise of Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some
Practical Implications, FRIED FRANK: M&A BRIEFING (Jun. 18, 2014), at 2, available at
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/FINAL%20%206182014%20TOC%20Memo%20-%20New%20Activist%20Weapon-%20The%20Rise%20of%20Delaware%20Appraisal%20Arbitrage.pdf (“With this timing
advantage, investors can review information in the company’s proxy statement relating to its sale
7

2/26/18
appraisal arbitrage creates a post-closing risk for buyers that will result in reduced deal prices, as
bidders hold back a reserve to deal with post-closing appraisal claims of uncertain magnitude.22
It has also been suggested that appraisal arbitrageurs, as the beneficiaries of appraisal awards,
divert value to themselves from the pre-existing holders from whom they purchase shares.23 We
are at best skeptical of these claims, however. The “free option” described by critics is unlikely
to have any substantial value in all but the most unusual case, and is not likely to have provided
the incentive for appraisal arbitrage.24 Likewise, the claim that appraisal arbitrage reduces deal
prices appears to be inconsistent with, or at least unsupported by, empirical research.25 Finally,
there is at least some empirical support for the assertion that appraisal arbitrage not only solves a

process and fairness of the price, can assess any pre-closing shareholder litigation that has been
commenced, and can evaluate market, industry and target company conditions at a time much
closer to the merger closing date (as of which time the court will determine fair value in an
appraisal proceeding) as compared to the time when the deal price was negotiated and then voted
on.”)
22
Norwitz, note [] above (“buyers will just respond to the new wave of appraisal arbitrage with
lower purchase prices, as they feel the need to hold something back for the likely appraisal
‘grab’”).
23
Jay B. Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 92
(2017) (“Rational acquirers that anticipate appraisal proceedings, even in marginal cases, will
self-insure against appraisal outlays by offering less for their acquisitions, thereby transferring
value from target shareholders as a class to the minority who dissent.”).
24
Booth, note [ ] above, at 328 (“the suggestion that arbs may capture the benefit of new
information that indicates a higher value for the subject company misconstrues how the appraisal
remedy works: It is almost impossible for any information revealed after a merger is announced
to affect fair price as determined by an appraisal court.”). Transkaryotic may be the rare case in
which that scenario actually occurred. See George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. L.
REV. 1635, 1638-1639 (2011) (noting that “overwhelmingly positive” test results on a new drug
arrived after the announcement of the merger but before the merger vote and the closing date).
25
Audra Boone, et al., Merger Negotiations in the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal, Sep. 30, 2017
working paper, at 3, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039040
(“none of our models suggest that bidders lower their offer price in response to heightened threat
of dissenters asserting appraisal”); cf. Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage
and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1555 (2015) (“appraisal
petitioners target transactions with lower deal premia and also going-private transactions, where
minority shareholders are most likely to face expropriation.”).
8
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collective action problem facing disaggregated pre-announcement stockholders in seeking
appraisal,26 but also results in increased prices for their stock.27
On balance, we conclude that appraisal arbitrage is an inapt target for unqualified
criticism or accolades: it simply makes the appraisal remedy viable in the case of a public
company merger where potentially dissenting shares are widely dispersed. If appraisal arbitrage
is a bad thing, it is only because and to the extent that the appraisal remedy is allowed to operate
in a manner that is inefficient.28 If a viable appraisal remedy creates problems or inefficiencies,
the debate should be about how to define where that remedy is available and what valuation
principles should apply. And that definition, we believe, should be shaped in a manner that
encourages (or at least permits) appraisal arbitrage where the remedy is useful, and discourages
appraisal arbitrage where it is not useful.
Determining whether the appraisal remedy is “useful,” of course, requires an articulation
of what purpose the remedy should serve. In this regard, we find it hard to improve on what Vice
Chancellor Sam Glasscock III recently described as “ruminations” about the appraisal remedy:29

26

Korsmo & Myers, note [ ] above, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. at 1555-1556 (2015) (“By buying up
large positions after the announcement of a transaction, arbitrageurs can overcome the collective
action problems that would otherwise render appraisal ineffective.”).
27
Boone, et al., at 20-21 (absence of an arbitrage spread in deals targeted by appraisal litigation
“implies that some of the gains from merger arbitrage … are shared with passive investors.”); see
also Scott Callahan, et al., Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder Value, (Nov. 9, 2017 working
paper), at 5, available at [ ] (“deal premia are discernibly higher in appraisal eligible transactions
(even after controlling for the tax status of the deal).”).
28
As a member of the Delaware Court of Chancery with considerable experience with appraisal
litigation has noted, “appraisal arbitrage is no better or worse than the underlying appraisal cause
of action: whether that action promotes efficiency or not, the effect — good or ill — is simply
magnified by the availability of arbitrage.” Hon. Sam Glasscock III, Ruminations on Appraisal,
DEL. LAW. 29 (Summer 2017).
29
Id. at 8. Much other ink has been spilled in the effort to divine the purpose of the appraisal
remedy. E.g., Thompson, note [ ] above.
9
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•

“The reason for appraisal must be sought, I think, in terms of efficient capital markets,
not fairness.”30

•

Because “few people would invest in equity ownership subject to squeeze-out [by
controlling stockholders] at an unfair price … [c]reating conditions that encourage
investment … requires a judicial appraisal, using valuation techniques, in the squeeze-out
or ‘classic’ appraisal situation.”31

•

In contrast, “I find little to recommend extending an appraisal right to dissenters in the
case of a ‘clean’ merger”32 – which he defines as one “where the stock is readily
transferable, approved by a disinterested board independent of any controller or other
conflict, and where the sale is consummated after an exposure to the market.”33

•

“To believe … [that] efficiency requires appraisal with respect to a clean merger, one
must also believe a number of subsidiary propositions,” namely that:
o

“[A]n entity has an objective, inherent value” that “is potentially higher than will
be developed by a sale with market exposure.”

o

“[T]he inherent value of an acquired entity is higher than the stand-alone value of
the company as determined (presumably erroneously) by its informed fiduciaries,
who must approve the sale.”

o

“[A] bench judge, armed with self-serving expert testimony from the parties, is a
more reliable diviner of inherent value than the market and the directors.”34

30

Glassock, note [ ] above, at 9.
Id.
32
Id. at 10.
33
Id. at 8.
34
Id.
31
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To this list of prerequisites of the use of appraisal in “clean” mergers, we would add the
proposition that such “inherent value” exceeds the value approved (presumably erroneously) by a
majority in interest of the persons (the stockholders) holding the economic interest in the
enterprise. The Vice Chancellor describes these propositions as “more or less unlikely,”35 and
concludes that that it is “unlikely that a lack of appraisal rights [in respect of “clean” mergers]
would dissuade investment.”36

III.

REFINING THE APPRAISAL REMEDY TO PROMOTE EFFICIENCY
A.

A Possible Statutory Solution

If that assertion by the Vice Chancellor is correct, and the availability of appraisal rights
in “clean” mergers carries with it countervailing costs and risks, the most logical reform is
simply to eliminate appraisal rights in that setting. Indeed, the Model Business Corporation Act
adopts such an approach in the case of publicly traded stock by eliminating appraisal rights
unless the merger constitutes an “interested transaction,”37 which it defines (phrased in a
somewhat oversimplified way) as a merger “involving” a holder of over 20% of the voting stock,
someone with power to name 25% or more of the board, or, in certain cases, a senior executive
who is to receive a side benefit in the merger.38 Delaware’s statute, in contrast, makes no
distinction between interested transactions and “clean” mergers, conferring appraisal rights (or
not) instead depending on the form of merger consideration.39 Thus, if the goal of appraisal is to
provide a check against deprivation of value due to conflict of interest, Delaware’s statute is both
35

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
37
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2016 Revision) §13.02(b)(4).
38
Id., §13.01 (defining “interested transaction”).
39
Section 262(b) (denying appraisal rights for widely held or traded shares, but restoring such
rights if the merger consideration is cash).
36
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overinclusive and underinclusive: it is overinclusive because it provides appraisal rights in a cash
merger negotiated at arm’s length and approved by a disinterested board of directors and a
majority of disinterested stockholders; it is underinclusive because it denies appraisal rights in
the case of a merger unilaterally implemented by a publicly traded controlling stockholder (and
its nominees on the board of directors) in which the minority stockholders receive shares of the
controlling stockholder. Despite persistent criticism and suggestions for reform,40 however,
Delaware’s appraisal statute has remained untouched in terms of its allocation of appraisal rights.
And even those who advocate an approach similar to the Model Act acknowledge the
difficulty of defining an “interested transaction,”41 or any other predictable dividing line between
mergers in which appraisal is a valuable check on market imperfection and mergers in which the
market can be trusted to provide a reasonable assurance that the transaction is delivering fair
value. Should appraisal rights be excluded in a merger approved by directors, even if all
disinterested, whose approval was the result of gross negligence? Where even disinterested
directors approve a deal based on a pre-signing market check was demonstrably deficient in
identifying likely bidders, and the merger was shored up by unusually strong deal protections?
40

Most recently, senior Delaware practitioner David McBride has urged that appraisal rights for
public company shares be limited to “interested transactions,” which “would be defined to
capture those situations in which the officers, directors or a majority of the stockholders have an
interest that conflicts with that of the dissenting stockholders.”
David C. McBride, Rebalancing the Merger Litigation Landscape, DEL. LAW. 24, 25-26
(Summer 2017). Previous critiques of the Delaware statute’s allocation of appraisal rights
include Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 16-21
(2000), and Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in
Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 53-54 (1995).
41
McBride, note [ ] above, at 26 (“The major disadvantage of this approach is the difficulty of
statutorily defining ‘interested transactions.’ What conflicts and whose conflicts justify providing
a valuation remedy?”). The Model Act provision itself suffers from an ambiguity in restoring
appraisal rights where the transaction is one “involving an interested person.” §13.01. The
Official Comment explains only that “involving” “denotes participation beyond merely voting or
participating on the same basis as other holders of securities of the same or a similar class or
series.”
12
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Attempting to account for such situations through a statutory allocation of appraisal rights could
bedevil statutory drafters for years to come.
B.

An Alternative Approach Involving Judicial Valuation

The other avenue for limiting appraisal to where it can be most useful involves tailoring
the principles for determining fair value in appraisal litigation. That avenue, which is the one we
advocate, would employ an approach to determining fair value that: (1) promotes appraisal (and
appraisal arbitrage) in cases where it represents a genuine check on a process for determining the
merger price that lacks assurance that the price is fair – most obviously, where the price is
proposed and imposed unilaterally by a controlling stockholder – and (2) discourages appraisal
where the process for determining the merger price provides assurance that the price is fair.
Refining judicial valuation approaches could obviate the need to engage in the development of a
bright line, predictably applied statutory rule for determining whether appraisal rights exist. If
those valuation approaches discourage the exercise of appraisal rights where the sale process is
robust, the extension of appraisal rights to mergers not warranting significant judicial scrutiny is
a problem more theoretical than real.42
With that proposition in mind, we turn to an examination of the development of the
approach to appraisal that we advocate and, in fact, we have seen evolving in the Delaware cases
in the last few years.
1.

Judicial Valuation History
a.

Defining “Fair Value” and Reliance on DCF Analysis

The use of deal price (or third party sale value) to determine fair value in appraisal
proceedings has undergone a striking evolution over the last 40 years or so. Early in that time

42

The authors acknowledge Stanley Keller as the source of this observation.
13
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frame, it was petitioning stockholders who argued for use of the deal price, or the value of the
company in a hypothetical sale or dissolution.43 And it was appraisal defendants who resisted use
of the deal price, on the theory that shareholders have no right in appraisal litigation to receive
the value that was or could have been received in a third-party sale.44 The defendants’ arguments
rested on both statute and case law: use of the deal price (or hypothetical third party sale value)
would include elements of value (synergies) attributable to the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger (or hypothetical merger), in violation of Section 262(h), and the case law’s reference
to fair value as a proportionate share of the value of the going concern precluded inclusion of
value attributable to the value of control reflected in the deal price.
Interestingly, the Delaware courts managed to sidestep this controversy, mostly because
they increasingly turned to discounted cash flow valuation techniques to determine fair value. As
we have written, a valuation aimed at yielding the present value of future free cash flows of the
subject firm is, at least theoretically, consistent with the case law definition of fair value as the
value of the going concern.45 By focusing solely on anticipated returns to the corporation itself,
that valuation approach conveniently, and appropriately, enables the courts to avoid applying
discounts of various sorts attributable to the nature or status of the dissenting shares (e.g., a
minority discount or a discount for lack of marketability), or premiums attributable to synergistic
merger gains or gains achievable through consolidation of control.
As the courts became more comfortable with DCF analysis, however, something
interesting happened. Contrary to the tenor of the debate in the 1970s and 1980s, when
43

Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware
Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119, 155 (2005) (“Cornfields”), discussing Bell v. Kirby Lumber
Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
44
Id. at 154 n. 140.
45
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in
Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (2009).
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petitioners argued for deal price and respondents argued for less, courts applying DCF analysis
increasingly arrived at valuations greater than the deal price. In some cases, this was not at all
surprising: for example, where the deal price is established unilaterally in a freezeout by a
controlling stockholder and, accordingly, the market for corporate control does not afford any
corroboration of the deal price as fair value, a responsible DCF analysis may well result in a fair
value in excess of the deal price. But, as it turned out, that sort of case was by no means the only
circumstance in which a DCF-based fair value was found to exceed deal price. Increasingly, this
outcome was observed in cases in which the court entertained some doubt about the efficacy of
even a conflict-free sale process.
In 2004, for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery used DCF analysis to award an
amount greater than the sale price of the company.46 In so doing, the court directly confronted
and rejected the respondent’s claim that the merger price was at least as great as fair value
because it was the product of “a ‘thorough and fair’ auction.”47 To the contrary, the court found
that after the founder/director/1% stockholder of the firm made a bid, the subsequent sale process
“likely did not include all potential bidders, was conducted quite hastily, and probably reduced
the likelihood that all bidders would be fully apprised of the Company's current prospects.”48 The
resulting fair value determination was $1.64 per share, about 60% higher than the $1.06 per share
deal price.
In that same year (2004), the Court of Chancery similarly disposed of another appraisal
case, in which the court used a DCF analysis to derive a fair value award of $24.65 per share,

46

Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004), aff’d, 875 A.2d
632 (Del. 2005).
47
Id. at *58.
48
Id. at *61.
15

2/26/18
which exceeded the deal price of $20.44 by around 20%.49 Despite noting that “as a general
matter, an arms length transaction may be a good indicator of value,” that the transaction at issue
“was the product of arm’s length negotiations,” and that “there is no suggestion that the sales
effort was not professionally handled,” the court was nonetheless dissuaded from reducing the
fair value award to a level at or below the deal price, due to a concession by the target’s
investment banker that the sales process was “desperate.”50
These cases foreshadowed the result in the better-known, perhaps even notorious,
litigation involving the acquisition of Dell by a private equity firm associated with Dell’s founder
Michael Dell. In that situation, the Court of Chancery found that despite the presence of Mr.
Dell, a director and 16% stockholder, on the buy side, the sale process used by the special
committee of independent directors was sufficient to “sail through” any challenge based on a
claim of breach of fiduciary duty.51 Finding a number of reasons to question the utility of the
deal price as a measure of fair value, however, the court gave exclusive weight to a DCF
valuation, and declined to give the deal price any weight “[b]ecause it is impossible to quantify
the exact degree of the sale process
mispricing.”52 Accordingly, the court set fair value at $17.62 per share, a 25% premium over the
$13.75 per share deal price.53
The Court of Chancery’s opinion in Dell may have been the high-water mark in a series
of cases in which the Delaware courts have acknowledged the theoretical utility of reliance on

49

Cede & Co. v. MedPointe Healthcare, Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, *1-2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16,
2004).
50
Id. at *77 n. 107.
51
Appraisal of Dell, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, at *88.
52
Id. at *168.
53
Id. at *1, *51.
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the deal price as an upper limit on fair value, but used DCF analysis to reach a fair value award
substantially in excess of the deal price.54
b.

Institutional Issues with DCF Analysis

Even as that series of cases unfolded, however, one could observe a countervailing trend
in Delaware appraisal litigation. As the courts honed their technique in evaluating and applying
discounted cash flow analyses, they became increasingly and visibly dismayed by the tendency
of litigation experts to present “wildly divergent” DCF valuations.55 Unconstrained by the
demands of clients deciding to pay or receive real money in a negotiated commercial transaction
based on DCF analysis, litigation experts could proffer such analyses pushing at “the outer limits
of plausibility.”56 Despite justly deserved commendations for their sophistication and energy in

54

As discussed below (text at notes [-]), the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Chancery’s valuation in Dell, sharply criticizing the failure to rely more heavily on market data,
including the deal price.
55
Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchants Bancorp of Western Pa., Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167,
*80 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016). See also Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund
Ltd., _ A. 3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *69] (“As is common in appraisal proceedings, each
party—petitioners and the Company—enlisted highly paid, well-credentialed experts to produce
DCF valuations. But their valuations landed galaxies apart—diverging by approximately $28
billion, or 126%.”); In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litigation, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *2
(Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 2016) (“it is quite common for the petitioner’s expert in an appraisal to reach
a DCF value twice that arrived at by the respondent’s expert”); Longpath Capital, LLC v.
Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, *27 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“Much has been
said of litigation-driven valuations, none of it favorable. Here, the parties have proffered widely
disparate valuation numbers … .”); In re Dole Food Co., 114 A.3d 541, 557 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“In
appraisal proceedings, the battling experts tend to generate widely divergent valuations as they
strive to bracket the outer limits of plausibility.”); Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., 2005 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 53, *41 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (“Men and women who purport to be applying
sound, academically-validated valuation techniques come to this court and, through the neutral
application of their expertise to the facts, come to widely disparate results, even when applying
the same methodology.”).
56
Dole Food, 114 A.3d at 557. The problem is not unique to Delaware appraisal litigation. See
Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in Bankruptcy, working paper (on
file with authors) at 3 (in bankruptcy valuation proceedings, “the discounted cash flow (DCF)
method is particularly susceptible to the kinds of manipulation that judges have difficulty
evaluating. Because this method leans heavily on subjective assumptions that are difficult to test
17
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evaluating those competing DCF claims,57 the Delaware courts have repeatedly acknowledged a
concern about institutional limitations on their ability to effectively sort out those “wildly
divergent” financial analyses.58
And as those courts have explicitly noted, the result of DCF analysis is highly susceptible
to wide swings based on seemingly small variations in the inputs to the analysis.59 In one recent

if not entirely untestable, we believe this method is not well-suited for adversarial litigation in a
bankruptcy case. It may be best used as a last resort when more transparent approaches
(surrounding market evidence, comparable transactions or comparable company multiples) are
unreliable, and only when discount rates can be calculated using well-grounded approaches.”).
57
E.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The deterrence value of stockholder appraisal, in
CLAIRE A. HILL & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, EDS., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS, ch. 16, at 349 (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2016) (“the five members of the
Court of Chancery are expert not only in the mechanics of valuation but also on the background
market realities of public companies. … [T]he output of appraisal proceedings in Delaware can
be expected to generate a valuation estimate of dissenters’ stock that is particularly credible.”);
see also Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 740 (2013) (“[T]he Delaware Court of Chancery is drawn
from experts in the corporate law community. Because of these judges' detailed knowledge of
business and business law, their decisions are informed, realistic, and highly respected.”).
58
See, e.g., Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *69] (“When … an appraisal is brought in
cases where a robust sale process … in fact occurred, the Court of Chancery should be chary
about imposing the hazards that always come when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point
estimate of fair value based on widely divergent partisan expert testimony.”); In re Dole Food
Co., 114 A.3d 541, 555 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“as this court's opinions frequently have observed, the
past and current members of this court are ‘law-trained judges,’ not valuation experts”); Huff
Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2013) (in
determining the value of real estate, “[a] law-trained judge would have scant grounds to
substitute his own appraisal for those of the real-estate valuation experts, and would have no
reason to second-guess the market price absent demonstration of self-dealing or a flawed sales
process,” and valuation of corporate stock arises in the “much more complex venue of the sale of
a corporate enterprise.”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 359
(Del. Ch. 2003) (“For me (as a law-trained judge) to second-guess the price that resulted from
that [active sale] process involves an exercise in hubris and, at best, reasoned guess-work.”).
59
E.g., Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., _ A. 3d at _ [2017 Del.
LEXIS 518, *73-74] (“DCF valuations involve many inputs—all subject to disagreement by
well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these inputs
can produce large valuation gaps.”); Merion Capital LP v. Lender Processing Svcs. Corp., 2016
Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, *89 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (“Small changes in the assumptions that drive
the DCF analysis, however, generate a range of prices that starts below the merger price and
extends far above it.”).
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case, the court lamented the fact that the parties’ experts presented DCF-based valuations
differed by a factor of over eight.60 Many DCF inputs can and often are disputed;61 judicial error
in evaluating such disputes could be resolved by resort to finance principles that are widely
accepted but not always applied by courts;62 but even within the constraints of such principles,
there can be plausible variation between optimism and pessimism about the firm’s prospects that
can cause major divergence among competing experts’ DCF valuations.63
The use of DCF analysis in appraisal litigation has also been criticized as skewed toward
excessive valuations. One commentator suggests that management projections, although widely
considered to be the most reliable basis for discounted cash flow analysis,64 may be

60

ISN Software, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *2 (“In a competition of experts to see which can
generate the greatest judicial skepticism regarding valuation, … this case, so far, takes the prize:
one of the Petitioners’ experts opines that fair value is greater than eight times that implied by
the DCF provided by the Respondent’s expert.”).
61
In ISN, for instance, the eight-fold difference between the experts’ DCF valuations was
attributable to disputes over a variety of inputs, including the initial cash flow projection period,
anticipated incremental working capital requirements, and the size premium for determining the
cost of equity. 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125 at *14-17. See also Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global
Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., _ A. 3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *74] (“management's
projections alone involved more than 1,100 inputs”).
62
Ayotte & Morrison, note [ ] above, at 11 (criticizing bankruptcy courts’ occasional acceptance
of adjustment of the discount rate on account of firm-specific risk, despite “fundamental
corporate finance theory, and recent evidence confirm[ing] that firm-specific risk is not relevant
to valuation. Yet experts routinely adjust discount rates (upwards or downwards) to account for
firm-specific risks.”).
63
See, e.g., Peltz v. Hatten, 279 B.R. 710, 737-38 (D. Del. 2002) (“Simply put, when it comes to
valuation issues, reasonable minds can and often do disagree. This is because the output of
financial valuation models [is] driven by their inputs, many of which are subjective in nature. …
The DCF method involves projections of future cash flows (which are largely dependent on
judgments and assumptions about a company’s growth rate) and judgments about liquidity and
the cost of capital.”). Most notably, differences of views about long-term growth (g) will
substantially affect the estimation of terminal value, often a very large portion of the total firm
value estimate. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The Real Problem with Appraisal Arbitrage, 72 BUS.
LAW. 325, [] (2017). Similarly, experts can plausibly differ with regard to near term estimates of
free cash flow, based on competing views of likely operating performance.
64
E.g., Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd., et al. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. 11448-VCL, slip
op. at 107 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (“As a source of estimated future cash flows, ‘Delaware law
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systematically overstated due to inherent optimism or a desire on the part of management to
demonstrate good performance, especially in anticipation of a potential sale in which their stock
(or stock options) would be acquired.65 Another commentator urges that the courts have
mistakenly used a future growth rate (g) that has been systematically excessive, due to the
practice of accepting that growth in the terminal period calculation will equal average growth in
GDP, without regard to required future reinvestment.66
Even in cases involving firms with actively traded shares followed by multiple
institutional analysts, where one might expect more neutral valuation incentives than those of
litigation experts, valuations may not coalesce within even a relatively narrow range. For just one
recent example, nine different firms published target price estimates for Citigroup during the
four-day period from July 14-17, 2017 and, despite the absence of any indication that those firms
were relying on different information or had any idiosyncratic incentive that would affect the
valuation, the resulting estimates ranged from $61 to $81 per share, a spread of over 30%.67

clearly prefers valuations based on contemporaneously prepared management projections
because management ordinarily has the best first-hand knowledge of a company’s operations.’”)
(quoting Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004);
ACP Master, Ltd. v. Clearwire Corp., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *80 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017)
(“The first key to a reliable DCF analysis is the availability of reliable projections of future
expected cash flows, preferably derived from contemporaneous management projections
prepared in the ordinary course of business.”) (quoting In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 89, *68 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017)).
65
Peter Welsh, et al., Management Projections in Delaware Appraisal Litigation: Anecdotal
Evidence, 31 INSIGHTS 15 (Oct. 2017) (suggesting systematic management bias to explain
shortfalls between actual post-merger performance and pre-merger management estimates).
66
Booth, 72 BUS. LAW. at 335 (using average GDP to reduce the discount rate is impermissible
“unless projected return is reduced to reflect new investment.”).
67
The estimates were:
Date
Target Price
Barclays
7/17/2017
$70.00
CFRA
7/14/2017
$68.00
Credit Suisse 7/16/2017
$72.00
Deutsche
7/14/2017
$61.00
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In many or perhaps even most litigation situations, experts will not even be constrained
by contemporaneous and public DCF analyses. In such situations, the problem of wildly
divergent analyses has been persistent and problematic, and a solution has been elusive. At one
point there had been a dalliance with the idea that the court could precommit to accept one side’s
position altogether, thereby encouraging the parties to avoid extreme valuation positions for fear
of having the court accept their opponents’ contention. In 1997, however, the Delaware Supreme
Court rejected that approach as inconsistent with the appraisal statute requiring the court to take
into account all relevant factors in determining fair value.68 At this point, adopting that approach
– sometimes described as “final offer arbitration” or the “baseball arbitration” approach – would
require a repudiation of that decision, either by the Delaware Supreme Court or by legislative

Evercore ISI 7/17/2017
JPMorgan
7/17/2017
Oppenheimer 7/14/2017
Sandler O'Neill 7/17/2017
UBS
7/14/2017

$ 68.00
$72.00
$81.00
$76.00
$68.00

(reports on file with authors). These estimates largely appear to reflect use of market multiple
approaches to valuation, rather than more fully articulated DCF analyses, but we see no reason to
expect less variation if firms were to use such DCF analyses more routinely. Cf. Ayotte &
Morrison, note [ ] above, at 10, indicating that market multiple approaches are likely to result in
less variability in valuation results than DCF analysis (in “46% of all cases, the experts fight over
the discount rate (WACC) and in 76% they dispute the projected cash flows. By contrast, the key
inputs to CCM [comparable company multiples] and TM [transaction multiple] valuations are
much less likely to be disputed. Across all cases, none of the key inputs—the selection of
comparable companies, the type of multiplier, or the enterprise value of the comparables—was
disputed in more than 20% of the cases.”); see also Jeremiah Green, et al., Errors and
Questionable Judgments in Analysts’ DCF Models, REV. ACCTG. STUD. (forthcoming), available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418478 (“we estimate that in our sample
analysts make a median of three theory-related or execution errors and four questionable
economic judgments per DCF.”).
68
Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361 (Del. 1997) (where the
Chancellor “announced in advance that he intended to choose between absolutes, … the
evidentiary construct he established for the subsequent trial created a standard for value
determination which is at odds with Section 262's command that the Court ‘shall appraise’ fair
value.”).
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change. There are no indications that either of those options is being actively explored69 and, in
any event, the evidence is at best equivocal that this approach would actually achieve its intended
purpose of bringing the parties’ DCF-based valuation contentions closer together. At least one
study of final offer arbitration finds that where parties have little to lose by going through the
proceedings, and results are inherently uncertain, contentions actually become more extreme and
do not converge as hoped.70 And in an appraisal litigation environment in which petitioners
rarely achieve fair value awards significantly less than the deal price, and results are necessarily
uncertain, empirical studies do not hold out much assurance that the courts’ frustration with
divergent valuation contentions would vanish under a final offer arbitration-type process.
Another possible solution to the problem of divergent expert valuation opinions is the use
of a court-appointed valuation expert. This idea is by no means new: it has been suggested
69

Amici in the DFC appeal expressly invited the Delaware Supreme Court to revisit and modify
the holdings in Gonsalves, but the court did not take up that invitation. Jennifer Arlen et al., Brief
of Law and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae, DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield
Value Partners, L.P. (Feb. 3, 2017), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/dfcholdings---appraisal.pdf at 23 (“if this Court were to limit or adjust the reasoning of Gonsalves v.
Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., the trial judge could employ approaches that incentivize greater
moderation among competing experts (such as “baseball arbitration” mechanisms), thereby
narrowing the valuation gaps between their analyses.”).
70
James B. Dworkin, Salary Arbitration in Baseball: An Impartial Assessment After Ten Years,
14 ARB. J. 63, 69 (March 1986) (“For those parties going to arbitration, the process has not
worked well in terms of causing the parties to submit reasonable final offers and final demands.
The data indicate that the final positions of the parties are not converging upon one another but
rather are spreading farther apart over time. Final-offer arbitrators may in fact be forced to select
from between two unreasonable positions, as some critics of this procedure have claimed.”). See
also Henry Farber, An Analysis of Final Offer Arbitration, 24 J. CONFL. RES. 680, 699 (1980),
available at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002200278002400407 (“final offers
tend to diverge where there is more uncertainty,” and “using uncertainty to promote negotiated
settlements will result in extreme awards where negotiations fail.”). On the other hand, Dworkin
finds that “[f]inal-offer arbitration in baseball has worked well in terms of enticing the parties to
bargain in good faith and settle their differences on their own.” 14 ARB. J. at 69; but see John L.
Fizel, Play Ball: Baseball Arbitration After 20 Years, DISP. RES. J. 42, 45 (June 1994) (“The
final-offer arbitration system has not reduced the gap between the demands of players and the
offers of owners but the system has also not widened the gap, especially not as dramatically as is
indicated by the use of average spread.”).
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multiple times,71 it was essentially required practice under the appraisal statute before 1976
(when an appraisal case initially was tried to a court-appointed “appraiser”72), and it was even
tried, at least once, after appraisers were eliminated as a statutory requirement.73 For a number of
possible reasons, however, the use of a court-appointed valuation expert has not caught on. For
one thing, use of a court-appointed valuation expert inevitably creates an additional layer of
litigation, because both sides understandably will want to have input into the neutral expert’s
deliberations, thereby creating something of a trial within a trial,74 much like the abandoned

71

E.g., Arlen, et al., note [ ] above, at 23 (“nothing in the statute prevents trial judges from
engaging independent valuation experts to make a neutral recommendation to the court.”). Arlen
et al. cite Cede & Co., 884 A.2d 26 at 34 for the proposition that the “Court of Chancery …
appoint[ed] a non-lawyer to serve concurrently as an independent expert witness on valuation
matters and as a special appraisal master.” Although literally correct, that fact doesn’t advance
the idea very much: in Cede, the Supreme Court rejected that very appointment, finding that the
court’s “appointment of a combination special appraisal master/independent expert witness and
the delegation of responsibility for valuing the Technicolor shares is unlawful because it is
contrary to the statutory mandate that "the Court [of Chancery] shall appraise the shares.” 758
A.2d at 487; In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992) (“if the Court is limited to the
biased presentation of the parties, it is often forced to pick and choose from a limited record
without the benefit of objective analysis and opinion. To compensate for this handicap, the Court
of Chancery should consider, in a proper case, appointing its own expert witness.”).
72
Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 360-361 (describing the requirement of appraisers under Section 262,
until the statute was amended in 1976 to eliminate that requirement).
73
See note [] above, describing the rejected appointment in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. See
also Hintmann v. Weber, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 58, *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 1999) (appointing a
special master to resolve “largely technical” issues remaining after issuance of a post-trial
opinion on fair value);
74
In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1223 (Del. 1991) (“The court appointed
expert is subject to the same standards which govern other expert witnesses under the Delaware
Rules of Evidence. The expert must advise the parties of all findings and submit to depositions.
Once trial commences, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to arrange for the court's experts
witness to testify if neither party calls him as a witness. The court's expert must be subject to
cross-examination by both parties, even if one party chose to call him as its witness. Finally, the
court's expert should be reasonably compensated by the parties in such proportion and at such
intervals as the trial court determines.”).
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statutory role of appraiser.75 In any event, in light of cases like Gonsalves and Technicolor, it is
likely that excessive reliance on an independent valuation expert would constitute a failure to
fulfill the court’s statutory affirmative requirement that the court “shall appraise” the fair value
of the shares at issue.76 Even though the Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the
Court of Chancery has the inherent authority to appoint neutral expert witnesses,"77 the court’s
ability to rely on such neutral witnesses is clearly circumscribed by the requirement that the court
make its own independent determination of fair value.
c.

Increasing Reliance on Deal Price to Measure Fair Value

It is against that backdrop that the most recent judicial valuation trend emerged, in which
- with respondents’ active encouragement – the courts began to rely more heavily on the merger
price to establish fair value in appraisal litigation. As is well known to contemporary readers,
that trend culminated in the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2017 opinions in DFC Global Corp. v.
Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.78 and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund
Ltd.79 In DFC, the court concluded that in the case of an arm’s length merger arising out of a
“robust market search” and free of any “hint of self-interest,” “economic principles suggest that
the best evidence of fair value was the deal price.”80 In Dell, the court further cautioned that
“when the evidence of market efficiency, fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to all logical
75

Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 361 (“The legislative synopsis for the bill proposing this change [to
eliminate the role of appraisers] recites that ‘[e]xperience has shown this two-step procedure to
be wasteful of time and money.’ Comm. to H.R. 916, 128th G.A., 2d Sess. (1976) (enacted).”).
76
Id., citing Section 262(h); see also id. at 360 (“The modern appraisal process presumes a
sophisticated judge who exercises independence in determining the value of corporation in a
contested proceeding.”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 496 (Del. 2000)
(“reference of an entire appraisal proceeding and the use of masters to determine the ultimate
valuation are not permitted by the present statutory appraisal scheme.”) (emphasis in original).
77
In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d at 1222-23.
78
172 A.3 346 (Del. 2017).
79
[2017 Del. LEXIS 518,] _ A.3d __ (Del. 2017).
80
DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
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buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the support of [the founder]'s own votes is
so compelling, then failure to give the resulting price heavy weight because the trial judge
believes there was mispricing missed by all the [company’s] stockholders, analysts, and potential
buyers abuses even the wide discretion afforded the Court of Chancery in these difficult cases.”81
We return below to discuss the ramifications of these opinions. They were by no means,
however, the first instances in which the Delaware courts relied on deal price to determine fair
value. One of the earliest instances of such reliance, in 1993, set the tone for several similar
subsequent opinions. In Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co.,82 Vice Chancellor Hartnett made a
number of prescient, insightful observations that resonate in later case law and in this article:

81

Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518 at *67-68]. The court in Dell also reminded students
of appraisal law that in appropriate circumstances, the price of a company’s stock in an efficient
trading market can also “have substantial probative value.” _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518,
*66]. In that case the court concluded that “the evidence suggests that the market for Dell’s
shares was actually efficient and, therefore, likely a possible proxy for fair value.” Id. at *4. See
also Aruba Networks, slip op. at 128 (“For Aruba, the unaffected public market price provides
the best evidence of its value as a going concern.”). The “evidence” to which the court in Dell
referred included proof of “a deep public float,” active trading (“with more than 5% of Dell’s
shares [] traded each week”), wide analyst coverage, and “a bid-ask spread of approximately
0.08%.” Id. at *7. These considerations mirror the factors used by courts to determine whether to
apply the fraud on the market presumption in federal securities class action litigation: “(1) the
average weekly trading volume expressed as a percentage of total outstanding shares of stock;
(2) the number of securities analysts following and reporting on the stock; (3) the extent to which
market makers and arbitrageurs trade in the stock; (4) the company’s eligibility to file SEC
registration Form S–3 (as opposed to Form S–1 or S–2); and (5) the existence of empirical facts
showing a causal relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an
immediate price response.” Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rebutting the Fraud on
the Market Presumption in Securities Fraud Class Actions: Halliburton II Opens the Door, 5
MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 33, 51 (2016), citing Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp.
1264, 1286–87 (D. N.J. 1989), and Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 473, 477–78 (N.D. Tex.
2001) (“considering additional factors that include the company’s market capitalization, the bidask spread for stock sales, and the stock’s trading volume without counting insider-owned stock
(i.e. float)”). We have previously identified circumstances, however in which share market prices
should not be relied upon to measure fair value. Rationalizing Appraisal Standards, note []
above, 50 B.C. L. REV. at 1034-37 (cautioning against use of share market prices in connection
with mergers involving controlling shareholders or shares that are thinly traded).
82
1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, *23-25 (Del.Ch. June 8, 1993).
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•

First and most important, he recognized that at least where other evidence of fair value is
unreliable, use of the deal price could be justified “under conventional principles of
economics.”83

•

He further acknowledged that use of the deal price had been regarded as inappropriate
because of the possible inclusion of a premium for control.84

•

Finally, he acknowledged that reliance on the deal price to measure fair value would have
the detrimental effect of setting that price as a floor, thereby creating a “no-lose”
proposition for appraisal petitioners.85
Despite Pabst’s general endorsement of deal price as a measure of fair value, that

approach in appraisal litigation did not emerge again in appraisal litigation until over a decade
later in the Union Illinois case, in which Vice Chancellor Strine, author of the Delaware Supreme
Court’s subsequent opinion in DFC, cited Pabst as the basis for using deal price as the key point
of reference for determining fair value.86 As he explained, “reliable evidence” of fair value
“includes the transaction that gives rise to the right of appraisal, so long as the process leading to
the transaction is a reliable indicator of value and merger-specific value is excluded.”87 Notably,
the court rejected a DCF approach to valuation, where that alternative approach resulted in a

83

Id. (“the results of the auction for Pabst might be expected to provide a reasonable indication
of Pabst's value that this Court can consider in light of the parties' failure to satisfactorily provide
a persuasive measure of value using other techniques.”).
84
Id. (“Delaware courts in the past, however, have been unwilling to consider just the results of
an "auction" between competing tender offerors as evidence of a firm's value because such offers
ordinarily contain a control premium unrelated to the value of the firm as a going concern.”).
85
Id. (“To allocate a pro rata share of a premium to dissenting shareholders would, in effect,
make the deal price a "floor" for the appraisal value. By making the deal price a ‘floor’ for the
appraised value, minority shareholders would be presented with a ‘no-lose’ situation if they seek
an appraisal and dissents from mergers would therefore be encouraged.”).
86
The Union Illinois 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 357 (Del. Ch. 2004).
87
Id.
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value below the deal price even net of a 13% discount for synergies.88 The contrast is striking
with contemporaneous appraisal opinions (in MedPointe and eMachines)89, in which the court
relied on a DCF approach to arrive at fair value in excess of the deal price.
Deal price as a measure of fair value emerged again in a 2007 Chancery opinion, in
which the court accorded a weight of 75% to a fair value estimate based on the deal price, less a
discount of 13% to account for deal synergies.90 The court reasoned that “a court may derive fair
value in a Delaware appraisal action if the sale of the company in question resulted from an
arm's-length bargaining process where no structural impediments existed that might prevent a
topping bid.”91 Similar to Union Illinois, the court declined to accord weight to a DCF analysis,
finding that “industry experts and executives do not consider a DCF a particularly important
framework for valuing a company whose primary business is selling life insurance.”92
Perhaps emboldened by these opinions, the respondent in the Golden Telecom appraisal
litigation arising out of a merger in 2007 urged Vice Chancellor Strine to rely on the deal price in
a case in which the two largest stockholders (together owning over 44% of the stock) had an
even larger equity interest in the buyer, and a special committee made no effort to engage in an
active market check.93 Not surprisingly, the Vice Chancellor summarily rejected that contention,
finding that “[t]here was no open market check that provides a reliable insight into [the target]'s
value.”94
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Id. at 359.
Notes – and – above.
90
Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 61 (Del. Ch. 2007).
91
Id.
92
Id. at 54.
93
Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 503 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 11 A.3d 214
(Del.2010).
94
Id., 993 A.2d at 499.
89
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On appeal, however, things took a confusing turn: according to the Supreme Court’s
opinion, the respondent advanced the robust contention that the court should adopt a standard
“requiring conclusive or, in the alternative, presumptive deference to the merger price in an
appraisal proceeding.”95 The Supreme Court did not merely reject that contention and affirm the
Vice Chancellor’s conclusion based on the factual finding that the merger price was an unreliable
guide to fair value in the case at hand; rather, the Supreme Court rejected the use of a
presumption of reliance on the deal price, “even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged
transactional process.”96
That language – questioning the presumptive use of deal price “even in the face of a
pristine, unchallenged transactional process” – of course does not literally preclude using the
deal price to determine fair value; it merely rejects any presumption in favor of such use. But that
observation seems like semantic formalism: when and why would “a pristine, unchallenged
transactional process” not permit use of the deal price to determine fair value?97 And if a process
endowed with such adjectives would not justify at least a presumption that the deal price is
95

Id., 11 A.3d at 216.
Id. at 218.
97
The confusion may stem from imprecision about the nature of judicial presumptions. If deal
price were presumptively determinative of fair value, the presumption would require such use of
deal price in the absence of any proof reflecting on the quality of the sale process. See Federal
Rules of Evidence Rule 301 (“In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide
otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing
evidence to rebut the presumption.”). Even if the deal price were presumed not to measure fair
value, once a respondent produced evidence demonstrating that the sale process was robust and
“pristine,” any such presumption – which only operates in the absence of proof that establishes a
result contrary to the presumed finding – would become irrelevant. See In re Transkaryotic
Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 349 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“defendants cannot rely on rebuttable
presumptions once plaintiffs have rebutted them.”); Staats by Staats v. Lawrence, 1990 Del.
LEXIS 301, *5-6 (Del. 1990) (describing the legal effect of a presumption under Delaware Rules
of Evidence Rule 301, and noting that although Rule 301 “specifically rejects the
‘bursting bubble’ rule which requires only that the opposing party produce some evidence to
rebut the presumption,” and that “once the presumption has been rebutted (whether at the level of
production or persuasion), it bursts.”).
96
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evidence of fair value, when would the deal price ever be used to measure fair value? In any
event, the Supreme Court’s language in Golden Telecom surely had to be discouraging to any
lower court judge asked to rely on deal price to measure fair value. Indeed, when the question
arose thereafter in appraisal litigation, the court rejected a request to rely on the deal price to
measure fair value, cautioning that cases supporting such reliance had been decided before
Golden Telecom.98 And in Huff Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc.,99 the petitioners went
so far as to argue that under Golden Telecom, the deal price was “now irrelevant in an appraisal
context.”100
Nevertheless, the chancellors persisted. Beginning in 2013, a series of opinions from the
Court of Chancery embraced the deal price as a measure of fair value:
•

In the first of those opinions (CKx), the court echoed one of the elements of the reasoning
twenty years earlier in Pabst: namely, that the court could rely on deal price if it
concludes that the sale process was reasonable and that other techniques for assessing fair
value are “unreliable.”101 Several subsequent cases took the same approach, relying
exclusively on the deal price to determine fair value, but suggesting that such reliance
was appropriate in part because other valuation approaches were unreliable.102

98

Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, *16 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(rejecting deal price as a measure of fair value in part because respondent “did not attempt to
adjust the merger price to remove the ‘speculative elements of value that may arise from the
'accomplishment or expectation' of the merger.’”).
99
2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2013), aff’d, 2015 Del. LEXIS 77 (Del. Feb. 12,
2015).
100
Id. at *34.
101
Id. (“In the absence of comparable companies or transactions to guide a comparable
companies analysis or a comparable transactions analysis, and without reliable projections to
discount in a DCF analysis, I rely on the merger price as the best and most reliable indication of
CKx's value.”).
102
Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, *42, *52 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30,
2015) (finding that the sale process was “comprehensive” and that, on the other hand, “there is
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•

Subsequent case law, however, appears to have disposed of any such limitation on
restricting use of the deal price to situations in which other valuation techniques are
unreliable. In Appraisal of Ancestry.com,103 the court relied exclusively on deal price; the
court was satisfied that its DCF analysis was reliable, but relegated that analysis to a
corroborative role of confirming that the sale process – which the court found
"represent[ed] an auction of the Company that is unlikely to have left significant
stockholder value unaccounted for" – provided “comfort that no undetected factor
skewed the sales process,” reassuring the court in its resolve to rely exclusively on the
deal price.104

•

Similarly, in Lender Processing105 the court relied exclusively on deal price, finding that
the company “ran a sale process that generated reliable evidence of fair value,” and that
even though the court’s own DCF analysis came out within 3% of the deal price, the
court treated the DCF result as merely corroborative, because even though the projections

no reliable data to input into a DCF or comparable companies model.”); Longpath Capital LLC
v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, *2 (finding that “the sales process in this
instance was thorough” but that “the management projections that provide the key inputs to the
petitioner's DCF analysis are not reliable. The parties agree that there are no comparable
companies.”); Merion Capital LP, v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, *49, *64
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) (finding that the sale process was “robust,” and that management
projections were “historically problematic, in a way that could distort value.”); In re Appraisal of
PetSmart, Inc., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, *4 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (finding that the sale
process was “reasonably designed and properly implemented,” but that the management
projections that were the basis for DCF analysis were “fanciful,” and there was no “evidence for
concluding that some other valuation methodology might lead to a reliable determination of fair
value.”). The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Dell may also fall into this category:
in that case, the noted “the obvious lack of credibility of the petitioners’ DCF model—as well as
legitimate questions about the reliability of the projections upon which all of the various DCF
analyses are based—[as] factors [that] suggest strong reliance upon the deal price and far less
weight, if any, on the DCF analyses.” Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 518, *73].
103
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21 (Jan. 30, 2015).
104
Id. at *50.
105
Merion Capital LP v. Lender Processing Svcs., Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189 (Del. Ch. Dec.
16, 2015).
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on which the DCF analysis was based were “reliable,” “[s]mall changes in the
assumptions that drive the DCF analysis … generate a range of prices that starts below
the merger price and extends far above it.”106
If there were any continuing thought from this case law development that use of the deal
price to determine fair value depended on a showing that all other valuation techniques were
demonstrably unreliable, the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in DFC put an end to it. When
the court said that “economic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal
price,”107 it was well aware of the features of the specific legal context (statutory appraisal) in
which those principles would operate, yet it concluded that “those features do nothing to
undermine the ability of the Court of Chancery to determine, in its discretion, that the deal price
is the most reliable evidence of fair value in a certain case … .”108 It is clear from this statement
that as a matter of law, the courts can, in the right circumstances, select deal price to measure fair
value, even if one or more other valuation techniques are reasonably reliable, simply because the
deal price may be the “most” reliable evidence of fair value.
2.

Critique of Reliance on Deal Price
a.

Academic Commentary

Arriving at that point in the evolution of valuation doctrine was controversial among
academics and practitioners. When the DFC case was on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court,
two competing camps of scholars submitted opposing amicus briefs – one urging that the deal
price should be presumed to constitute fair value,109 and the other contending that such
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Id. at *89.
DFC 172 A.3d at 349.
108
DFC, 172 A.3d at 367 (emphasis added).
109
Stephen Bainbridge et al., Brief of Law and Corporate Finance Professors as
Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal, DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value
107
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presumptive use of the deal price would unduly deter meritorious appraisal claims and harm
stockholders.110
Although it could be said that the “deal price presumption” camp lost (in the sense that
the Supreme Court declined to adopt a presumption in favor of using the deal price), these
academic adversaries were not shooting at each other across a bright line, and the differences in
their positions were not as stark as might have first appeared. Those advocating a presumption in
favor of reliance on the deal price acknowledged that other approaches to determining fair value
could be appropriate “where the transaction price bears indications of misinformation or bias,” or
“where material information is withheld from the market.”111 Conversely, those arguing against
the presumptive use of the deal price acknowledged that on appropriate facts the deal price could
be used to measure fair value, and that “[t]he Court of Chancery should be permitted to marshal
its equitable discretion to decide—on a case-by-case basis—how much weight merger price
warrants relative to other factors.”112 The key question, then, is how the courts should exercise
that discretion.
b.

The Proper Scope and Benefits of Reliance on Deal Price

Whatever the merits of the various academic positions on the use of deal price to measure
fair value, the Delaware courts appear to have arrived at a reasonably workable approach to the
question. Most obviously, and consistent with the statutory and traditional judicial approach to
appraisal litigation, they have rejected the use of any presumption regarding the use of deal

Partners, L.P. (Jan. 6, 2017), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/dfc-holdings--bainbridge.pdf.
110
Jennifer Arlen et al., Brief of Law and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae, DFC
Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. (Feb. 3, 2017), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/dfc-holdings---appraisal.pdf.
111
Bainbridge, et al., note [ ] above, at 16-17.
112
Arlen, et al., note [ ] above, at 16.
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price.113 Similarly, they have not chosen to look to the deal price to measure fair value in cases in
which conflicts of interest on the part of a controlling stockholder or one or more members of the
board of directors would lead a court in fiduciary duty litigation to require the proponents of the
transaction to establish its entire fairness.114
In transactions in which the proponents have no conflict of interest, the Delaware courts
do not appear to have developed any formulaic or bright line tool to determine when deal price
should measure fair value.115 What we discern from the case law, however, is a tendency to rely
on deal price to measure fair value where the transaction would survive enhanced judicial
scrutiny, i.e., when a court would conclude that the transaction’s proponents have demonstrated
that the process that led to the merger, although perhaps not yielding the optimum outcome for
target stockholders, was nonetheless at least reasonable.116 Thus, in order to determine whether
to use the deal price to establish fair value, the Delaware courts are engaging in the same sort of
scrutiny they would have applied under Revlon if the case were one challenging the merger as in
breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties. In effect, the courts are applying a presumption against

113

DFC, 172 A.3d at 366; Golden Telecom, 11 A.3d at 217-218.
E.g., Dunmire, note [] above.
115
Lender Processing, note [] above, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *33 (“evaluating the reliability and
persuasiveness of the deal price for purposes of establishing fair value in an appraisal proceeding
is a multifaceted, fact-specific inquiry. The relevant factors can vary from case to case depending
on the nature of the company, the overarching market dynamics, and the areas on which the
parties focus.”).
116
See DFC, 172 A.3d at 370-371 (“the purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the
petitioners get the highest conceivable value that might have been procured had every domino
fallen out of the company’s way; rather, it is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for
their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly
be given to them in an arm’s length transaction.”); Dell, _ A.3d at _ (2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 518,
*62-63 (“The issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible
bid. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not exploited.”);
Aruba Networks, slip op. at 82 (the Delaware Supreme Court’s approach in DFC and Dell
“appears to rule out inquiry into whether a different transaction process might have achieved a
superior result.”).
114

33

2/26/18
use of the deal price to measure fair value, because unless the respondent demonstrates that the
transaction process was reasonable, the court declines to use that measure of fair value.117
Indeed, in a very recent opinion, the Court of Chancery coined the term “Dell Compliant” to
identify what must be shown to establish that it “may consider the deal price as persuasive
evidence of statutory fair value.”118
We discuss below the similarities in the considerations the courts have brought to bear in
scrutinizing the deal process, in both appraisal and Revlon litigation, and conclude this section
with some observations about the utility of the approach we have observed.
i.

Appraisal Cases

In addition to confirming the absence of disabling conflicts of interest on the part of
transaction proponents, the courts in appraisal litigation have identified a number of factors that
incline them toward accepting the deal price as evidence of fair value.119 “Meaningful
competition among multiple bidders during the pre-signing phase” appears to be the most
compelling positive factor,120 and favoring use of the deal price to measure fair value based on

117

Dell establishes, on the other hand, that “[t]here is no requirement that a company prove that
the sale process is the most reliable evidence of its going concern value in order for the resulting
deal price to be granted any weight.” Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *67 (emphasis in original).
118
In re Appraisal of AOL, Inc., C.A. No. 11204-VCG (Del. Ch., Feb. 23, 2018) slip op. at 20.
119
Id. (“A transaction is Dell Compliant where (i) information was sufficiently disseminated to
potential bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii) without undue impediments
imposed by the deal structure itself.”).
120
Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189 at *45 (“The first factor supporting the
persuasiveness of the Company's sale process is the existence of meaningful competition among
multiple bidders during the pre-signing phase.”); BMC, 2015 WL 6164771, at *14-15 (reciting
that the company conducted “a robust, arm’s-length sales process” that involved “two auctions
over a period of several months,” where the company “was able to and did engage multiple
potential buyers during these periods,” and where the lone remaining bidder “raised its bid
multiple times because it believed the auction was still competitive.”); AutoInfo, 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 128, at *34 (noting that the merger price was “the result of competition among many
potential acquirers.”); Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, at *71 (target “actively solicited
every buyer it believed could be interested in a transaction” before signing a merger agreement);
34
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that factor is consistent with the views of even the scholars most skeptical about such use of the
deal price.121 Even before DFC, however, and certainly afterward, it is clear that the presence of
multiple competing bidders in the pre-signing phase is not a prerequisite to such use. In DFC
itself, the acquirer was the only bidder, yet the court explained that “the fact that the ultimate
buyer was alone at the end provides no basis for suspicion” of the deal price, given other indicia
of a reasonable sale process.122 Earlier opinions also confirm that the deal price can be a reliable
measure of fair value even in a single-bidder situation, as long as other circumstances
demonstrate that “the process by which [the target was] marketed to potential buyers was
thorough, effective, and free from any spectre of self-interest or disloyalty.”123
Those other circumstances, in addition to the absence of any conflict of interest, include
the duration of the sale process124 and the efforts by the target and its investment banker to

Ancestry.com, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21 at *10 (“Ultimately, seven potential bidders submitted
non-binding preliminary indications of interest”); Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359 (finding that the
merger “resulted from a competitive and fair auction” in which “several buyers with a profit
motive” were able to evaluate the company and “make bids with actual money behind them.”);
CKx, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, at *47 (noting that “the bidders were in fact engaged in a
process resembling the English ascending-bid auction” involving direct competition between
bidders).
121
Notes [ ] above.
122
DFC, 172 A.3d at 376. It remains to be seen on remand, of course, whether the deal price will
be given exclusive weight in determining fair value; but the Supreme Court specifically rejected
the Court of Chancery’s determination to accord it only one-third weight. Id. at [ ] (“we cannot
sustain the Chancellor’s decision to give only one-third weight to the deal price because the
factors he cited in giving it only that weight were not supported by the record.”).
123
Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 at *70-71, quoting CKx, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262 at
*42.
124
Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *52 (“The go-shop's forty-five-day window afforded
potential bidders enough time to decide whether to continue to explore a transaction … .”); DFC,
172 A.3d at 376 (“Houlihan had approached every logical buyer,” and “no one was willing to
bid more [than Lone Star] in the months leading up to the transaction … .”).
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contact potentially interested purchasers.125 Other cases using the deal price to measure fair value
rely on the adequacy of information about the target available to potential bidders,126 and public
awareness of the existence of the sale process.127 The courts have also looked to the scope of deal
protections during the post-signing period, inclining toward reliance on the deal price as deal
protections diminish in potential impact.128
It is instructive, on the other hand, to note what circumstances (again, apart from conflict
of interest) have led the courts to decline to use deal price to measure fair value. The sample of
such cases is small, and recently became even smaller with the reversal of the Court of
Chancery’s opinion in Dell. In that case, “[a] confluence of multiple factors caused [the Court of
125

Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 at *76-77 (target’s financial advisor “(1) contacted
twenty-four third parties . . . ; (2) sent non-disclosure agreements (‘NDAs’) to twelve . . . ; (3)
received executed NDAs from six . . . ; and (4) remained in discussions with three”).
126
Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *60 (“the likelihood of a winner's curse can be
mitigated through a due diligence process where buyers have access to all necessary
information”)]; Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189 at *52 (“Another factor supporting
the effectiveness of the sale process in this case was that adequate and reliable information about
the Company was available to all participants, which contributed to the existence of meaningful
competition.”); Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 350 (the company “was marketed in an effective manner,
with an active auction following the provision of full information to an array of logical
bidders.”).
127
See Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *52] (“given leaks that Dell was exploring
strategic alternatives, record testimony suggests that Evercore presumed that any interested
parties would have approached the Company before the go-shop if serious about pursuing a
deal.”); Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 at *82 (“This lengthy, publicized process was
thorough and gives me confidence that, if Ramtron could have commanded a higher value, it
would have.”).
128
See, e.g., AOL, slip op. at 20 (absence of “undue impediments imposed by the deal structure
itself” is a prerequisite to being “Dell Compliant” permitting reliance on the deal price); Aruba
Networks, slip op. at 86 (reviewing deal protection terms and concluding that “[t]his combination
of defensive provisions would not have supported a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”); Dell, _
A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *52-53] (“submitting a non-binding indication of interest that
qualified as a Superior Proposal’ [] would lower the termination fee from $450 million to $180
million thanks to ‘Excluded Party’ status and give that party months to scrutinize the Company's
finances and growth prospects.”); In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 86 (Del. Ch.
2007) (“the deal protections the Topps board agreed to in the Merger Agreement seem to have
left reasonable room for an effective post-signing market check. For 40 days, the Topps board
could shop like Paris Hilton.”)
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Chancery] not to give greater weight to the deal price, including (i) the transaction was an MBO,
(ii) the bidders used an LBO pricing model to determine the original merger consideration, (iii)
there was compelling evidence of a significant valuation gap driven by the market's short-term
focus, and (iv) the transaction was not subjected to meaningful pre-signing competition.”129 The
court concluded that “there were structural impediments to a topping bid on the facts of the case,
particularly in light of the size and complexity of the company and the sell-side involvement of
the company's founder.”130
In a fashion that was at least in part predictable in light of its opinion in DFC, however,
the Delaware Supreme Court rejected each of these considerations as a basis for disregarding the
deal price. First, use of an LBO pricing model based on demanded internal rates of return is no
longer a legally viable reason to disregard the deal price in determining fair value. As the court
explained in DFC, and reiterated in Dell, “[t]hat a buyer focuses on hitting its internal rate of
return has no rational connection to whether the price it pays as a result of a competitive process
is a fair one.”131
The “valuation gap driven by the market's short-term focus” likewise did not survive
DFC as a reason not to rely on the deal price. In DFC, the Court of Chancery had reduced the
significance attached to deal price in part because “DFC was in a trough with future performance
dependent upon the outcome of regulatory actions … .”132 To this, the Supreme Court responded
that (1) share markets take regulatory risk into account, (2) share trading prices have not lost
relevance to fair value, and (3) buyers consider regulatory risk; simply because the company’s
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Lender Processing, *86 (summarizing the court’s previous decision in Dell).
Id. at *87.
131
DFC, 172 A.3d at 375. The Supreme Court reiterated that conclusion in Dell. _ A.3d _ at _
[2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *50].
132
2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103, at *67-68.
130
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“growth story was not accepted by the markets does not mean that the markets ignored it.”133
And in Dell, the court similarly and emphatically rejected the suggested “valuation gap” as a
reason to reject deal price as a measure of fair value.134
The court in Dell also rejected several of the Court of Chancery’s other justifications for
declining to give weight to the deal price in determining fair value. It did so, however, because of
what it found to have been a lack of factual support; the implication, therefore, is that if properly
documented, those justifications could have supported the lower court’s decision not to give
weight to the deal price. For example:
•

The court concluded that the company’s founder and largest stockholder, Michael Dell,
“only had approximately 15% of the equity,” and had “pledged his voting power would
go to any higher bidder, voting in proportion to other shares.”135 Had Mr. Dell’s holdings
been larger, or had he not pledged to vote for a higher bid in proportion to other shares,
perhaps the court would have viewed the effect of his involvement as an impairment of
the sale process and, thus, a reason not to give weight to the deal price.

•

Similarly, the court rejected the lower court’s conclusion that “’Mr. Dell’s value to the
Company’ imposed another impediment to the likelihood of rival bidders succeeding and
thus dissuaded them from even trying.”136 The court found that this conclusion was
factually unsupported, based on evidence that other bidders did not “’regard Mr. Dell as
essential to their bids,’” and based also on the lack of evidence that he would not

133

DFC, 172 A.3d at 375.
Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *46] (“The record before us provides no rational,
factual basis for such a ‘valuation gap’” where the market in Dell stock was proven to be
efficient, for the reasons described in note [] above).
135
Id. at _ [*55].
136
Id. at _ [*63].
134
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continue to serve the company if another bidder had prevailed.137 Had the evidence
shown, however, that Mr. Dell’s participation with other bidders was essential yet
unavailable, the court might well have concluded that the result of the sale process could
not be relied upon to measure fair value.138
•

Finally, the court concluded that the “winner’s curse” theory – that bidders “resist
outbidding incumbent management for fear they might later discover the information that
management from bidding even higher in the first place”139 – “might deter rival bids in
some MBOs,”140 but was rebutted in the Dell situation by (i) the fact that two financial
sponsors submitted competing bids during the go-shop period, and (ii) the lower court’s
finding that “all of the bidders received access to the data they requested.”141
What the Dell litigation ultimately highlighted was a central legal issue bearing on the

relationship between fiduciary duty doctrine and the willingness of the courts to use deal price in
appraisal proceedings. In no uncertain terms, the Court of Chancery in Dell emphasized that
judged by enhanced scrutiny standards in fiduciary duty litigation, the merger would “sail
through.”142 Yet the court at the same time decided not to give any weight to the merger price,

137

Id. at _ [*64].
In AOL, the Court of Chancery employed similar considerations in declining to accept the
deal price as a measure of fair value. The court noted that during the post-signing period the
company “was constrained by a no-shop provision, combined with: (i) the declared intent of the
acting CEO to consummate a deal with Verizon [the buyer], (ii) the CEO’s prospect of postmerger employment with Verizon, (iii) unlimited three-day matching rights, and (iv) the fact that
Verizon already had ninety days between expressing interest in acquiring the entire company and
signing the Merger Agreement, including seventy-one days of data room access.” Id., slip op. at
22-23. “Cumulatively,” the court concluded, “these factors make for a considerable risk of
informational and structural disadvantages dissuading any prospective bidder.” Id.
139
Id. at _ [*60].
140
Id. at _ [*62].
141
Id. at _ [*61].
142
Dell, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, *88.
138
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“[b]ecause it is impossible to quantify the exact degree of the sale process mispricing.”143 Hence
the key issue: if a merger satisfies even enhanced judicial scrutiny, can the deal price be
irrelevant in determining fair value? Is the appraisal remedy thus somehow unmoored from the
question of the reasonableness of fiduciary conduct in approving the merger?
DFC strongly suggested that the answer to these questions is no, and the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Dell eliminated any doubt about that suggestion. According to DFC, “the
purpose of an appraisal … is to make sure that [dissenting stockholders] receive fair
compensation for their shares in the sense that if reflects what they deserve to receive based on
what would fairly be given to them in an arm’s-length transaction.”144 And what is “fairly
given,” according to the court, is not some abstract, idealized concept of some inherent or
intrinsic value;145 rather, fair value is what “a reasonable seller, under all the circumstances,
would regard as within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably accept.”146
In Dell, the Supreme Court confirmed the link between a finding of appropriate fiduciary

143

Id., *168.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 371 .
145
See Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 517 n. 126 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d,
11 A.3d 214 (“the hoary term "intrinsic value," [is] best reserved for judgments of the divine
than ones made by human judges.”).
146
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370, quoting Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1143
(Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). We share this rejection of the notion that
stockholders are entitled to some inherent or intrinsic value, or that such a value even exists. This
view marks our principal, if not only, quarrel with the premises of the most articulate opponents
of the “market price rule.” See Albert Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price”
Appraisal Rule, [citation to current draft] at 5 (positing that appraised value can be “too high, too
low, or just right by objective criteria.”) (emphasis added). We do not quarrel, however, with the
suggestion that a legal definition of fair value that created a relatively high reserve price would
have the effect of increasing observed merger premia. We do not venture an opinion as to
whether such high premia would have a net positive wealth effect, taking into account the
interests of acquirers and their investors, or whether such higher premia would reflect a legally
imposed wealth transfer from acquirers to target stockholders. See also Callahan, et al., note [ ]
above, at 5 (“if the anticipated appraisal right grows “too large,” it can be detrimental to target
shareholder welfare (akin to imposing an unrealistic reserve price on an auction).”).
144
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conduct and reliability of the deal price to measure fair value: reciting the lower court’s finding
that the deal “easily would sail through if reviewed under enhanced scrutiny,” the court
identified that finding as one that would “suggest the deal price deserves weight.”147
In any event, the range of reasonableness concept of fair value advanced in DFC is
strongly evocative of enhanced judicial scrutiny under Revlon and its progeny,148 so it seems
reasonable as a matter of doctrinal interpretation to conclude that the standard under Revlon for
validating a merger involving a sale of control is equivalent to the standard under the appraisal
statute for determining whether to use the deal price to measure fair value.
Subramanian argues for a somewhat stricter standard, including a presumption that the
deal price measures fair value “in a true arms-length deal with meaningful price discovery.149 We
suppose that his advocacy of any sort of presumption does not survive doctrinally after DFC, but
we do not fault him for that advocacy. His centrist approach to the so-called “market price rule”
issue is the closest to our own view, and if we part company with him, it is on the question of
whether deal price can measure fair value where the sale process involved only a post-signing

147

Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2016 Del. LEXIS, *56]; see also Aruba Networks, slip op. at 86-87 (noting
that “would not have supported a claim for breach of fiduciary duty,” and concluding that “there
is good reason to think that the deal price exceeded fair value and, if anything, should establish a
ceiling for fair value.”).
148
E.g., C&J Energy Servs. v. City of Miami Gen. Employees' & Sanitation Employees' Ret.
Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014) (“a court applying Revlon's enhanced scrutiny must
decide "whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision.”) (emphasis in
original).
149
Guhan Subramanian, Using the Deal Price for Determining “Fair Value” in Appraisal
Proceedings, at 23 (Feb. 6, 2017 draft), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/20170206_Subramanian-draft_9aa5b475-ed614fae-8b39-9b2de9d09425_78008941-390f-458a-a0e0-92863f300dc8.pdf, forthcoming in THE
CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (U. Chicago Press) (“in a
true arms-length deal with meaningful price discovery, there should be a strong presumption that
the deal price represents fair value in an appraisal proceeding; but if the deal process does not
include a meaningful market canvass and an arms-length process, deal price should receive no
weight.”).
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market check (via a go-shop provision) subject to a continuing match right. His position is that
“an exclusive pre-signing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in which the buyer gets an
unlimited match right would probably not qualify for deference to the deal price.”150 The use of
the word “probably” makes it unclear how stringently this position should be applied, but we
would reject, as the courts have done under Revlon, any position that the sale process is
necessarily defective, such that the deal price should not be relied upon to measure fair value, in
the event it entails an exclusive pre-signing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in which
the buyer gets an unlimited match right.151
In any event, because we maintain that the Revlon line of case law can and should inform
how the courts evaluate when to rely on the deal price in determining fair value, we find it
helpful to review briefly how the courts applying Revlon have determined whether a merger
survives enhanced judicial scrutiny.152
ii.

Revlon Cases

That line of case law demonstrates that the Delaware courts have on occasion found that
a sale process run by even a disinterested board of directors may fail to survive the enhanced
judicial scrutiny required by Revlon. For example, in In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holders

150

Id. at 22.
Cf. In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 87 (Del. Ch. 2007) (concluding that where a
merger agreement provided for a 40-day go-shop, a bifurcated termination fee and matching
rights, “this approach to value maximization was likely a reasonable one,” even in the absence of
a pre-signing market check); see also AOL, slip op. at 21 (“if front-end information sharing is
truncated or limited, the post-agreement period should be correspondingly robust, so to ensure
that information is sufficiently disseminated that an informed sale can take place and bids can be
received without disabling impediments.”).
152
We do not mean to suggest that the courts should not take into account the reliability of DCF
analysis when deciding whether to rely on the deal price to determine fair value. To the contrary,
particularly in a case in which the reasonableness of the sale process is closely contestable, the
inclination to rely on deal price may vary inversely with the court’s confidence in the reliability
of DCF analysis. See text at notes [-] above.
151
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Litig.,153 the court preliminarily enjoined an acquisition by two private equity firms, finding that
the board’s efforts to identify potential strategic bidders was inadequate154 and that for a microcap company a post-signing market check should not be deemed as reliable as in the case of a
widely followed, large-cap company.155 The court therefore concluded that “the board's failure to
engage in any logical efforts to examine the universe of possible strategic buyers and to identify
a select group for targeted sales overtures was unreasonable and a breach of
their Revlon duties.”156 Similar findings in an appraisal case should presumably lead the court to
decline to accept the deal price as a proxy for fair value.
In a case decided the same year as NetSmart, the court found that the directors’ conduct
in a different phase of the deal process failed to meet Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny standard. In In
re Topps Co. S’holder Litig.,157 the court focused on the board’s refusal to release a competitor
(Upper Deck) from a standstill agreement in order to permit it to proceed with an offer for the
target during a 40-day go-shop period. The court emphasized the importance of such a period
where there had been no pre-signing market check, and concluded that the board’s “decision to
foreclose its stockholders from receiving an offer from Upper Deck seems likely, after trial, to be
found a breach of fiduciary duty” under Revlon.158 Had the case involved a statutory appraisal, it

153

924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007).
Id. at 196 (“What was never done by … the board was a serious sifting of the strategic market
to develop a core list of larger healthcare IT players for whom an acquisition of Netsmart might
make sense.”).
155
Id. at 197 (“Precisely because of the various problems Netsmart's management identified as
making it difficult for it to attract market attention as a micro-cap public company, an inert,
implicit post-signing market check does not, on this record, suffice as a reliable way to survey
interest by strategic players. Rather, to test the market for strategic buyers in a reliable fashion,
one would expect a material effort at salesmanship to occur.”).
156
Id. at 199.
157
926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
158
Id. at 92.
154
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seems likely that the court, for similar reasons, would have declined to use the deal price to
measure fair value.
By contrast, a transaction can satisfy Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny even in the absence of a
pre-signing market check and multiple bidders at any stage. In Pennaco, Inc. Shareholders’
Litig.,159 the court rejected Revlon claims where the board had negotiated exclusively with one
bidder before entering into a merger agreement with that bidder, and no other bidder emerged.
What was critical to the court’s acceptance of the sale process as reasonable was that the “board
was careful to balance its single buyer negotiation strategy by ensuring that an effective postagreement market check would occur.”160 And what made the post-agreement market check
effective was that “no substantial barriers to the emergence of a higher bid existed.”161 In these
circumstances, the fact that no other bidder emerged, despite the fact that the transaction was
well publicized and the company was widely followed, was taken by the court as “"evidence that
the directors, in fact, obtained the highest and best transaction reasonably available."162 If a court
in an appraisal proceeding were to reach the same conclusion, it seems almost certain, at least

159

787 A.2d 691 (Del. Ch. 2001).
Id. at 707.
161
Id. (“The merger agreement's provisions leave [the acquirer] exposed to competition from
rival bidders, with only the modest and reasonable advantages of a 3% termination fee and
matching rights.”). Cf. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, *45 (Del.
Ch. May 21, 2013) (“in forgoing a pre-Agreement market check, and relying on an ambiguous
fairness opinion, the Board had to be particularly scrupulous in ensuring a process to adequately
inform itself that it had achieved the best price,” yet “deal-protection devices which included a
no-shop clause and which provided that don't-ask-don't-waive provisions already in place would
continue, prevent[ed] the Board from learning whether [two private equity buyers] were
interested in bidding.”).
162
Id., quoting Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, 729 A.2d 280, 293 (Del. Ch.
1998).
160
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after DFC and Dell, that the court would look to the deal price as a significant or even exclusive
factor in determining fair value.163
Nevertheless, Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny leaves plenty of room to address a scenario that
has caused some justifiable concern on the part of critics of use of the deal price to measure fair
value: specifically, a circumstance in which the compensation arrangements or other interests of
the CEO or perhaps other senior managers as well create incentives on their part to negotiate and
approve a deal and forgo the real possibility of alternative transactions that would provide greater
value for stockholders generally.164 One can always quarrel about the extent to which the courts
can effectively police the effect of such misaligned incentives,165 but existing doctrine certainly
permits an inquiry into such incentives and their effects,166 and there is no motion to dismiss
pleading stage obstacle to such an inquiry in appraisal cases.

163

See Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *54] (the trial court’s “assessment that more
bidders—both strategic and financial—should have been involved assumes there was some party
interested in proceeding. Nothing in the record indicates that was the case. Fair value entails at
minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the
market would pay.”).
164
See, e.g., Matthew Schoenfeld, The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017:
Premia Down, Agency Costs Up, working paper (Aug. 27, 2017), at 4, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028381 (CEOs willingness to accept
suboptimal deals for stockholders “stems not only from CEOs’ ability to internalize 100% of
their CIC package while externalizing most ‘costs’ of a lower transaction price, but also from
any additional rents they are able to extract—via transaction-related bonuses or ex-post
Parachute augmentations—at the expense of disinterested shareholders.”).
165
Schoenfeld plainly maintains that the current litigation system fails to do an adequate job:
“Amid the recent enfeeblement of germane shareholder litigation, it is perhaps not surprising
then that as premiums have fallen, Parachutes and related bonuses have burgeoned.”) Id.
166
For example, plaintiffs in Pennaco argued that the golden parachutes of the senior officers
motivated them and the board to accept a poor deal. Although the court rejected the argument on
the facts – the two senior officers were also very large stockholders who were unlikely to have
sacrificed substantial value for the stock just in order to activate their severance payments – the
court was at least open to entertaining this argument against reliance on the deal price. 787 A.2d
at 708-710. In contrast, in El Paso S’holders Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 443 (Del. Ch. 2012), the court
found a likely breach of fiduciary duties under Revlon in part because of the CEO’s personal
interest in acquiring a business from the company’s merger partner. As the court explained:
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iii.

The Continuing Utility of Appraisal (and Appraisal
Arbitrage)

By suggesting that the inquiry whether to use the deal price to measure fair value should
be as demanding (or undemanding) as enhanced scrutiny under Revlon, we are not contending
for any sort of “market price rule” or presumption in favor of using the deal price to measure fair
value; to the contrary, we argue in favor of the opposite presumption, under which respondents
in appraisal cases who argue in favor of such use of the deal price will be required, as with any
valuation contention in appraisal cases, to come forward with evidence sufficient to establish the
reasonableness of the sale process.167 As a result, there is no reason to think that the test of
whether to use the deal price in appraisal cases will be any less demanding than the application
of the enhanced scrutiny standard in Revlon preliminary injunction cases.
In fact, with post-closing damages claims under Revlon having been substantially
circumscribed by the impact of stockholder approval of mergers after Corwin,168 it may be the

“when there is a reason to conclude that debatable tactical decisions were motivated not by a
principled evaluation of the risks and benefits to the company's stockholders, but by a fiduciary's
consideration of his own financial or other personal self-interests, then the core animating
principle of Revlon is implicated. As Revlon itself made clear, the potential sale of a corporation
has enormous implications for corporate managers and advisors, and a range of human
motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can inspire fiduciaries and their
advisors to be less than faithful to their contextual duty to pursue the best value for the
company's stockholders.” Id. at 439. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866 (Del.
1985) (finding directors personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty in approving a merger
largely negotiated by a CEO whose retirement was imminent and who opposed a potentially
better LBO deal in which younger members of management might take his place).
167
Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 221 (Del. 2005) (“In a statutory
appraisal proceeding, each side has the burden of proving its respective valuation positions by a
preponderance of the evidence.”); M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del.
1999) (“In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving their
respective valuation positions by a preponderance of evidence.”).
168
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312-313 (Del. 2015) (“[W]hen a
transaction is not subject to the entire fairness standard, the long-standing policy of our law has
been to avoid the uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the disinterested
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appraisal remedy, rather than the class action for breach of fiduciary duty, that will supply the
primary private litigation check on the conduct of the sale process.169 We see this possibility as a
salutary one, for two principal reasons. First, as Subramanian notes,170 bidders who face the risk
of post-closing appraisal litigation will have an incentive – so long as the appraisal remedy
remains viable – not to impose demands upon target boards that would increase the prospect that
the court would decline to find the sale process to have been reasonable, and thereby increase the
risk of an appraisal award substantially greater than the deal price.171 Second, we concur with the
assessment of Korsmo and Myers that appraisal litigation (especially where driven by appraisal
arbitrage) is structurally superior to class action litigation in the sense that there is less concern
that the litigation will be driven by counsel, and a greater likelihood that the litigation will be
initiated and resolved based on the interests of clients with substantial investments in the shares
at issue.172

stockholders have had the free and informed chance to decide on the economic merits of a
transaction for themselves.”).
169
See Korsmo & Myers, note [ ] above, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. at 1599 (“If … a merger is agreed
to at a price far enough below fair value—measured in conventional financial terms—appraisal
arbitrageurs will have an incentive to accumulate a position and seek appraisal. In so doing, the
arbitrageur will serve as a check on low-ball merger agreements and freeze-outs.”).
170
Subramanian, note [] above, at 19 (buy side principals and their advisers “could encourage the
sell-side board to have a good deal process (pre-signing auction, no matching rights, etc.) in
order to reduce their post-closing appraisal risk.”). Subramanian also points out, however, that
such encouragement might be limited because it could (and would presumably be intended, in
effect) to drive up the acquisition price. Still, fostering an incentive to bidders to avoid excessive
demands for bidding advantage and deal protections would be a useful countervailing effect of
an appraisal rule that required examination of the quality of the sale process.
171
Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *73] (“If the reward for adopting many mechanisms
designed to minimize conflict and ensure stockholders obtain the highest possible value is to risk
the court adding a premium to the deal price based on a DCF analysis, then the incentives to
adopt best practices will be greatly reduced.”).
172
Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. at 1555 (appraisal “litigation [is]
controlled, by the actual plaintiff—the appraisal arbitrageur—rather than the plaintiffs’ attorney.
… In addition, the narrow focus of an appraisal claim and the possibility a court will determine
47

2/26/18
It is not our view, however, that appraisal arbitrage, coupled with rejection of the deal
price where conflicts of interest or other deficiencies in the sale process render the deal price
unreliable as a measure of fair value, will necessarily result in the most completely balanced
check on opportunism. We say this because unmitigated reliance on unadjusted deal price creates
a no-lose rule, presciently warned against a quarter century ago in Pabst:173 with a statutory
presumption of an award of fully compensatory pre-judgment interest,174 appraisal arbitrageurs
would suffer little or no down side and could afford to be undiscriminating in targeting deals
tainted by conflict of interest or process failures. As a result, that system would elicit overlitigation of appraisal cases because, in our view, an unadjusted deal price frequently overstates
fair value. Why? Because, as the Delaware courts have repeatedly held, the deal price may (and
often does) include synergistic value to which the target’s stockholders, as such, have no legal or
economic claim of entitlement. In the section that follows, we therefore address how the
determination of fair value should take account of synergistic merger gains in order to arrive at
an appropriate balance of risk in appraisal litigation.175

fair value to be below the merger price render the risks and costs of litigation far more symmetric
than in other forms of shareholder suit, further reducing the potential for nuisance claims.”).
173
Note [] above.
174
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (“Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise for
good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the merger through the date of payment of
the judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the Federal Reserve
discount rate . . . .”). We concur with Korsmo and Myers, however, that the statutory
presumptive interest rate is unlikely in itself to generate additional appraisal litigation. Id. at
1555, 1580-1581 (“Given the risks an appraisal petitioner must assume—an extended period of
illiquidity with an unsecured claim against a surviving company that may be highly leveraged,
plus the risk of the legal claim itself—the idea that interest rates are driving sophisticated parties
to target appraisal is implausible.”). Of course, compensatory pre-judgment interest eliminates an
artificial disincentive to pursue litigation.
175
Because we believe that appropriately deducting synergistic value from the deal price will
achieve an appropriate balance of risk, we do not support the more aggressive step of
establishing a privately ordered cost-shifting regime, which - if elected - would require appraisal
arbitrageurs to pay the defendant corporation's legal fees and costs in the event that such
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IV.

THE IMPACT OF SYNERGIES ON FAIR VALUE
A.

Case Law

Among the clearest propositions in Delaware appraisal case law is that if deal price is to
be used to determine fair value, it must be adjusted to eliminate the portion of that price
attributable to synergistic merger gains. That legal proposition has been stated as follows:
Cavalier Oil and its progeny seem to require the court to exclude “any value that the
selling company’s shareholders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the
subject company, not as a stand-alone concern, but as part of a larger enterprise, from
which synergistic gains can be extracted.”176
That proposition has been invoked frequently in the case law,177 and appears to be “inspired by a
desire to honor the statute [Section 262]’s command that the court ‘determine the fair value of

defendant carries the burden of proof in demonstrating the fairness of the merger price. Jay B.
Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 134-136
(2017) (“the possibility of fee shifting should serve as a meaningful deterrent against
unmeritorious and low-probability claims, and improve acquirers' settlement leverage if they
honestly believe the merger price was fair.”).
176
DFC, 172 A.3d at 368, quoting Union Illinois 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd.,
847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2004), citing Cavalier Oil , 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989).
177
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., A.3d at__[2017 Del. LEXIS
518, *39], citing Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del. Ch. 2010),
aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010) (“the court should exclude ‘any synergies or other value expected
from the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself.’”); Aruba Networks, slip op. at 53
(same); ACP Master, Ltd. et al. v. Sprint Corp., et al., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *79 (Del. Ch.
July 21, 2017) (“the appraisal statute requires that the Court exclude any synergies present in the
deal price, that is, value arising solely from the deal.”); In re Appraisal of SWS Group Inc., 2017
Del. Ch. LEXIS 90, *29 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017) (“When the merger price represents a transfer
to the sellers of value arising solely from a merger, these additions to deal price are properly
removed from the calculation of fair value."); Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchs. Bancorp of W.
Pa., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, *28 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016) (“the Court's task in a Section
262 appraisal action is to determine the going concern value of the enterprise as of the merger
date exclusive of any element of value—such as the value of achieving expected synergies—
from the accomplishment of the merger.”); Longpath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015
Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, *83 (Del. Ch. June 30 2015) (“in an appraisal action, it is inappropriate to
include merger-specific value”); Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 72 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (“The court must … exclude synergistic elements from the sale price to arrive at a fair
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the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger.’”178
There is remarkably little clarity or consistency in the case law, however, about how to
apply this proposition. The courts’ treatment of precisely what synergistic value to exclude in
specific cases has been erratic, no doubt because of inconsistencies in the quality of proof, rather
than any inability on the part of the courts to assess the evidence. Key examples, however,
include:
•

Union Illinois: In this relatively early case, the court observed that the finance literature
“does not contain a reliable method for estimating the portion of a merger premium that
results from expected synergy value.”179 Nevertheless, the court approved “a reasonable
synergy discount of 13%,” because potential bidders were large banks that expected
synergistic gains, and the target’s banker’s “DCF model, which it used in giving its
fairness opinion, had mid-range synergy assumptions of 15%-20% for the synergy value
that would be shared with [target] as a seller.”180

•

AXA: The court approved a discount of $4.12 per share, 13% less than the deal price of
$31 per share, based on accepting a corrected “sum of the parts” evaluation of the target

value.”); Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 220 (Del.Ch. 2005) (“In
performing its valuation, the Court of Chancery is free to consider the price actually derived
from the sale of the company being valued, but only after the synergistic elements of value are
excluded from that price.”); M.P.M. Enterprises, Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 796 (Del. 1999)
(valuation approach “was undoubtedly proscribed by § 262(h)” “because it focused on the
elements of value that would arise from the merger, rather than on the going concern value of
MPM without any consideration of such synergistic values.”).
178
DFC, 172 A.3d at 368, citing Section 262(h).
179
Id. n. 35, citing John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law:
Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1351-52 (1999).
180
Union Illinois, at n. 26.
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of $26.88 per share.181 The court declined to accept a synergies estimate based on a
discounted cash flow analysis that the expert in question found unreliable as a basis for
evaluation of the firm itself.182
•

Ramtron: The court accepted a synergy discount of $0.03 per share (less than 1%) from
the merger price of $3.10 per share.183 The court’s calculation of that estimate was more
opaque than the derivation of the approximately 11% estimate that the court rejected, an
estimate which was based on two distinct approaches: (i) estimating the ratio of
premiums paid by strategic and financial buyers generally, on the theory that the
difference between the two is attributable to synergies, and (ii) inferring total synergies of
$0.69 per share from a comparison of target stand-alone projections with the buyer’s
projections, and assuming that 50% of those synergies would be shared with the target’s
stockholders.184 The court rejected the first approach because it “does not tell me
anything about this specific transaction, which must be the focus in a Section
262 action.”185 It rejected the second approach because it “focuses solely on cost savings,
which are positive synergies, and neglects the possibility of negative synergies.”186 The
petitioner’s expert’s 1% estimate of synergy ostensibly took into account testimony about

181

Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61. The court placed a 75% weight on the result (deal price minus
estimated synergies).
182
Id. The court had found that “industry experts and executives do not consider a DCF a
particularly important framework for valuing a company whose primary business is selling life
insurance.” Id. at 54.
183
Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 at *85-86.
184
Id.
185
Id. at *85 (emphasis in original).
186
Id. at *86.
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negative synergies, so the court found that it “better conforms to the evidence adduced at
trial than Ramtron's position.”187
B.

Defining Synergies in a Fair Value Determination

Given the clear position that synergy value shared with the target’s stockholders by
inclusion in the purchase price must be deducted from the price where the deal price is used to
determine fair value, Delaware law could benefit from a similarly clear articulation of what
constitutes synergy for purposes of this calculation, and how that calculation should be made.188
We begin with the first of these two topics.
The task of defining synergy is superficially simple: as expressed in a recent Delaware
appraisal case, it is “value arising solely from the deal.”189 As previously noted, this definition
proceeds from and tracks the appraisal statute’s exclusion of “any element of value arising from

187

Id.
We thus focus on the definition of synergies from a legal perspective. From a financial
perspective, synergies come in a variety of categories. See, e.g., Anna Loukianova, et al.,
Valuing Synergies in Strategic Mergers and Acquisitions Using the Real Options Approach, 14
INV. MGMT. & FIN. INNOV. 236, 236 (2017) (“Operating synergies involve the improvement of
companies’ operating activities. They can be achieved, because, since the combined firm is
bigger than any of the companies before the M&A deal, it can exert economies of scale, exercise
greater pricing power and provide new opportunities for growth in new or existing markets.
Financial synergies come from the fact that the merged firm can bring better debt capacity, as
well as the tax benefits resulting from operating losses from the target firm, asset revaluations,
etc.”); Taher Hamza, et al., How Do Takeovers Create Synergies? Evidence from France, 11
Studies in Business & Economics 54, 55 (2016), available at
http://eccsf.ulbsibiu.ro/RePEc/blg/journl/11105hamza&sghaier&thiraya.pdf (“Higher operating
synergies are synonymous with revenue increase, cost savings, investment cutbacks and greater
market power. Indeed, enhanced efficiency with regard to productive assets improves the
operating cash flows, leading to heightening of the firm's value. As for financial synergies, they
encompass tax savings and decreased bankruptcy risk through diversification of the merged
entity, which generates lower weighted average cost of capital.”).
189
ACP Master, Ltd. et al. v. Sprint Corp., et al., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *79 (Del. Ch. July
21, 2017).
188
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the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”190 Despite this superficial simplicity,
however, determining whether an element of value arises “from” the merger can be deceptively
complex.
To illustrate this, consider the famous case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.191 In that case, the
operative reality of the target company (TransUnion) included the fact that despite strong cash
flows, accelerated depreciation prevented it from generating sufficient taxable income to use its
investment tax credits.192 The value of those tax credits might have been exploited in two ways:
the first way (the one that actually occurred) was a sale of the company to an acquirer able to
apply the tax credits to its income from other sources; the second way, which TransUnion
considered, was to acquire additional income-generating businesses.193 Let us assume (although
the record is not completely clear on the point) that the $55 per share merger price included some
amount attributable to the value the acquirer expected to realize through use of TransUnion’s
investment tax credits. Should that amount be deducted from the deal price in measuring fair
value, because it was value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger?
In a literal sense the answer is clear: of course it should be deducted, because it was the
merger that enabled the acquirer to extract (and pay target stockholders for) the value of the tax
credits. Suppose, however, that TransUnion was also in a position to extract that value on its
own, through a program of asset acquisitions.194 In that circumstance, would it still be
appropriate to make the deduction?

190

DFC, 172 A.3d at 368, citing Section 262(h).
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
192
Id. at 864-865.
193
Id. at 865.
194
This assumption may be counterfactual: according to the recollection of counsel for the
acquirer, TransUnion “had a lot of tax law carry forwards. They didn't have enough operating
income to take full advantage of them, and that in a sort of perverse way was causing a burden
191
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In previous writings we have claimed that the answer is no: the potential to extract value
from the tax credits should be viewed as having been an opportunity belonging to Trans Union,
and even if that value was ultimately achieved through the mechanism of the merger, that value
should be treated as belonging to TransUnion and thus a component of its fair value for appraisal
purposes.195 In that case, in our view, it would be improper to reduce the fair value determination
by the putative synergy component of the deal price, because to do so would deprive target
stockholders of an element of value of the going concern (namely the target’s own opportunity to
extract value from the tax credits).
A hypothetical further illustrates this point. Consider the case of a target firm owning a
set of patents that would be valuable to a company with capital and marketing clout sufficient to
exploit the patents. Assume further, however, that the target firm lacks both of these attributes,
and that a merger with a well-heeled acquirer enables the combined firm to generate substantial
value from the patents. Again, should a portion of that value, if shared with target stockholders,
be deducted from the deal price to arrive at a fair value for their stock? And again, our answer is
no, or at least not necessarily, even though it could be said that the value arose from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger. Why? Because we have not excluded the
possibility that the target could, on its own, have realized such value (or at least a substantial part
of it) through an agreement to license the patents. In that circumstance, the potential additions to

on their stock. So they couldn't buy companies fast enough and manage them to take care of that
problem.”). Transcript of interview with A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Jan. 24, 2017, at 21, available at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6758-sparks-vangorkom-interview-transcript.
195
Hamermesh & Wachter, Cornfields, note [] above, 31 J. CORP. L. at 164-165 (proposing use
of the corporate opportunity doctrine to define when potential future cash flows belong to the
corporation, and should therefore be considered to contribute to the fair value of the
corporation’s shares).
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cash flow, while in fact brought about by the merger, could just as well be considered to have
belonged to the target firm.196
Our point is that in evaluating a deduction for synergies, courts and litigants should be
careful to distinguish between gains that arise solely from the merger – solely, in the sense that
the gains would not have come about but for the occurrence of the merger – and gains that would
likely have been achieved by the company on a standalone basis. This distinction still leaves
plenty of room to identify synergies that really do arise solely from the merger. Although cost
reductions (staff reductions, for a typical example) may in some circumstances be achievable by
the going concern on a standalone basis, they would surely arise solely from the merger if they
could not realistically be achieved by the target on that basis, and depend for their existence on
scale that would not exist but for the merger.
Defining the appropriate scope of deductible synergies implicates one further and
probably controversial question relating to the value of control. The key example is the leveraged
buyout led by a private equity firm. In that situation, as we have written previously, “the
aggregation of the shares is value-creating because a controller can then exercise the control
rights involving directing the strategy and managing the firm.”197 Should that incremental value
be treated as part of the operative reality of the going concern, or as a value arising only from the
accomplishment of the merger (and therefore not part of fair value in appraisal litigation)?

196

An even clearer case for treating gains ostensibly connected to a merger as belonging to the
acquired firm is where the merger is accomplished by a controlling stockholder which, before the
merger occurs, had begun to implement the improvements that follow the merger. See Coates,
note [] above, 147 U. PA. L. REV.at 1350-1351, describing Weinberger v. UOP and Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc. (“the synergies included in fair value determinations in those two cases were
limited to synergies that both were ‘known’ as of the date of the merger and were related to steps
that had previously been taken by the controlling shareholder, so that the synergies were
plausibly ‘part of’ the company being valued.”).
197
Rationalizing Appraisal Standards, 50 B.C.L. REV. at 1052.
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Decisions from the Court of Chancery would suggest that such incremental value should be
viewed as part of the value of the going concern.198 We have taken the contrary position,
however, because “the value is created by the aggregation process and does not exist
independent of it, [so] the logical and normatively compelling conclusion is that the value
creation should accrue to the party that has created it.”199 Applying that reasoning to our
example, the private equity purchaser, by consolidating ownership and control through the
purchase of disaggregated shares, creates additional value that could not be generated by the firm
as constituted (with agency costs arising due to disaggregation of control), and that additional
value must be excluded from the determination of fair value.200
C.

Estimating the Size and Allocation of Synergies

Having arrived at an appropriate, if necessarily imprecise, definition of synergy for
purposes of the legal context of determining fair value in an appraisal proceeding, the remaining
– and not insubstantial – task is to articulate an appropriate approach for courts and litigants to
take in estimating the total amount of synergies expected to arise from a merger, and identifying
the portion of that amount incorporated in the deal price and thereby shared by the buyer with the
198

Id., citing Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *70 (Del. Ch. Aug.
19, 2005); Borruso v. Communc’ns Telsys. Int’l, 753 A.2d 451, 458-59 n. 10 (Del. Ch. 1999);
LeBeau v. M.G. Bancorp, Inc., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, *39 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998); but see
[next footnote].
199
Id. The recent opinion in Aruba Networks embraces this view. Id., slip op. at 126-127 (“When
an acquirer purchases a widely traded firm, the premium that an acquirer is willing to pay for the
entire firm anticipates incremental value both from synergies and from the reduced agency costs
that result from unitary (or controlling) ownership. Like synergies, the value created by reduced
agency costs results from the transaction and is not part of the going concern value of the firm.”)
(emphasis in original).
200
We develop this point more fully in Rationalizing Appraisal Standards, at 1047-1054. Again,
we recognize that the view of Delaware courts may be at odds with our own. See, e.g., In re
Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21 at *50 (suggesting that in an acquisition by a nonstrategic purchaser, synergies are unlikely: “as is typical in a non-strategic acquisition, I find no
synergies that are likely to have pushed the purchase price above fair value.”); but see Aruba
Networks, slip op. at 126-127.
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target’s stockholders. At the outset of this discussion, we acknowledge that there is remarkably
little scholarship, in law, finance or economics, on this precise subject.201 Accordingly, what we
have pieced together below from that limited scholarship and from informal presentations by
several investment bankers202 is a suggestion of how appraisal litigants and the courts might
approach the issue of synergies.
The matters of estimating overall synergies and evaluating how they are allocated as
between the buyer and target stockholders are two quite distinct determinations, and we therefore
address them separately.
1.

Estimating Total Synergies

It has been suggested that total synergies arising from an acquisition can be estimated
using the following three-step calculation:
1. “[V]alue the firms involved in the merger independently, by discounting expected cash
flows to each firm at the weighted average cost of capital for that firm.
2. “[E]stimate the value of the combined firm, with no synergy, by adding the values
obtained for each firm in the first step.
3. “[B]uild in the effects of synergy into expected growth rates and cash flows and …
revalue the combined firm with synergy. The difference between the value of the combined firm

201

See, e.g., Raffaele Fiorentino & Stefano Garzella, The Synergy Valuation Models: Towards
the Real Value of Mergers and Acquisitions, 124 INT’L RES. J. OF FIN. & ECON. 71, 72 (2014),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195551 (“theoretical and
empirical research still lacks a common understanding of the effectiveness of synergy valuation
models in M&A.”).
202
In particular, we acknowledge with gratitude insights from James DelFavero (Goldman
Sachs), Erik Gilje (Wharton School), and Jonathan Mir (Lazard), although they are not to be
blamed for any errors or inaccuracies in our interpretation of their very helpful suggestions.
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with synergy and the value of the combined firm without synergy provides a value for
synergy.”203
We believe that this approach makes perfect sense from a theoretical standpoint. We
suggest, however, that applied to real world litigation to determine fair value, it is both
unrealistic and unnecessary. It is unrealistic because it would require valuing the expected free
cash flows of not one but three distinct firms, thereby defeating the principal benefit of being
able to rely on a fixed deal price instead of wildly disparate competing discounted cash flow
valuations. This would compound the problems inherent in calculating future values that we
have discussed above. In the normal appraisal, there is the calculation of the value of the target
firm. Experts can have optimistic or pessimistic stories to tell about the target’s firm future
value. In the three-step approach, there are three stories, with different valuation estimates
hanging on whether the expert is optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the target firm, the
acquiring firm, and the combined firm with synergies.
In the context of statutory appraisal litigation the three-step approach is not only
unrealistic, it is unnecessary as well, because once the first component of the exercise is
completed, and a DCF value for the target firm as an independent entity has been established,
there is no occasion (if the analysis is reliable) to continue with the remainder of the exercise.
Since the target firm is being valued without regard to the effects of the merger, the synergies
arising from the merger do not need to be estimated and deducted from the value of the firm to
arrive at fair value.
A second approach to estimating synergistic merger gains involves an assessment of the
response of acquirer and target stock (or stock option) prices to announcement of the merger
203

Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Synergy, at 6-7 (Oct. 2005), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=841486 (emphasis in original).
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terms.204 We pass over the details of that approach, however, because it is likely to be available
in real world appraisal litigation only rarely. The approach requires that the stock of both
acquirer and target be publicly traded. Market-based information should be used whenever it is
available, but in the typical appraisal case, in which the stock of either the target or the buyer, or
both, is not publicly traded, there is insufficient market-based information to use this technique
to estimate synergies. Among the forty or so appraisal cases in the last fifteen years that
generated a valuation opinion, only eleven involved both a publicly traded target and a publicly
traded buyer. And in the eight of those nine cases that did not involve a freezeout by a
controlling stockholder205 or a significant conflict of interest on the part of two major
stockholders,206 the stockholders seeking appraisal fared remarkably badly: the median
increment of the fair value determination over the deal price was negative 4-8%; the average
increment was negative 19.4%; the best outcome was a positive increment of 3%; and the worst
outcome was a negative increment of 85%.207 With such results, it seems most unlikely that
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Kathryn Barraclough, et al., Using Option Prices to Infer Overpayments and Synergies in
M&A Transactions, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 695 (2013); Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han
Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their Division Between the
Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. OF FIN. ECON. 3(1988).
205
See Appendix (Prescott Group v. Coleman Co. and AT&T Mobility). The Appendix to this
article lists Delaware appraisal cases since 1997, and recites for each such case the deal price, the
fair value established by the court, and the percentage difference between those two figures, as
well as whether the underlying transaction was an “interested transaction” as defined in Model
Business Corporation Act § 13.01. In recent cases, the fair value judgment of the Court of
Chancery specified in the Appendix may not be final (i.e., may be subject to appeal or revision
on remand).
206
See Appendix (Global GT v. Global Telecom). That case involved a clear conflict of interest
on the part of the two largest stockholders of the target company (owning over 44% of the stock),
which also held large blocks (greater in percentage terms and absolute value) of the bidder’s
stock. Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 503 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, Golden
Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT, LP, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
207
See Appendix: Merion v. 3M Cogent (+3%); Longpath v. Ramtron (-1%); AOL (-3%);
Andaloro v. PFPC (-4%); SWS (-8%); AXA Financial (-22%), Aruba Networks (-35%) and
Clearwire (-85%).
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appraisal arbitrage or other active use of the appraisal remedy will occur in cases of public
company acquisitions of other public companies, except in cases of freezeouts by a controlling
stockholder or other transactions that involve conflicted major stockholders. Given that likely
infrequency, it is doubtful at best that the courts will have much occasion to adopt an approach
dependent on trading prices of publicly held target and bidder stock.
A third approach, and the one we advocate, calls for a direct assessment of the value of
synergies and is not dependent on public trading of either the target’s or the bidder’s stock.
Specifically, we suggest an approach in which each element of synergy is framed in terms of
periodic incremental improvements to future free cash flow, and the resulting stream of
anticipated incremental cash flows is reduced to present value.208 An illustration of our approach
may be helpful. Assume that Target (T) and Buyer (B) have accounting staffs of 25 and 75
persons, respectively, but that after their merger the combined firm will employ an accounting
staff of only 90 persons. Assume further that the aggregate annual compensation of the 10
accounting staff members who will no longer be employed is $1 million. Assume further, finally,
that T and B had anticipated that, but for the merger, those 10 persons would have been

208

See Jens Kengelbach, Dennis Utzerath, & Cristoph Kaserer, How Successful M&A Deals Split
the Synergies, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP (Mar. 27, 2013), available at
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/mergers_acquisitions_postmerger_integration
_divide_conquer_deals_split_synergies/?chapter=2 (“Because synergies tend to mount over time
and become fully effective after roughly two years (assuming skillful management by the
acquirer), the value of synergies can be stated as the present value of ongoing synergies after two
years.”); Kristen Ficery, et al., The Synergy Enigma, available at
https://www.criticaleye.com/insights-servfile.cfm?id=47 (“Synergies are the present value of the
net, additional cash flow that is generated by a combination of two companies that could not
have been generated by either company on its own.”); Fiorentino & Garzella, note [ ] above, 124
INT’L RES. J. OF FIN. & ECON. at 73 (describing the “net present value model” in which “the
synergy value is the present value of the expected synergy flows from the deal process,
discounted back at a rate that reflects the riskiness of these flows.”). According to survey results
gathered by Fiorentino & Garzella, this model is, by a wide margin, the most frequently used. Id.
at 77.
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employed going forward indefinitely. With these assumptions, and putting aside tax
considerations, one can define the synergy achieved by the merger as a stream of future free cash
flows of $1 million per year in perpetuity. Applying an appropriate discount rate applicable to
the combined firm209 (say 10% for illustrative purposes) yields a present value of $10 million. In
an actual case, the analysis would surely be more complex. The full benefit of synergies may not
be achieved immediately: in our example, it may take one or two years to achieve the
contemplated staff reduction. Similarly, the expected synergy may be offset by related costs
(sometimes described as negative synergies): in our example, again, there may be severance
payments required to achieve the contemplated staff reductions, and those payments would have
to be deducted from the anticipated cash flow enhancements.
This approach can also be applied to synergies involving revenue enhancements rather
than cost reductions.210 The analysis would simply examine what revenue enhancements are
expected, year by year, and would discount the resulting future cash flows to a present value to
arrive at the synergy contribution of the revenue enhancement under examination. We suspect,
however, that synergistic revenue enhancements will ordinarily be harder to predict than cost
synergies and, therefore, less likely than cost synergies to contribute to a discount from deal
price to arrive at fair value.211

209

Note that because it is the combined firm that generates the future cash flows under
consideration, it is that firm’s cost of capital, and not the cost of capital of the target firm, that
should be applied in estimating the present values of synergistic gains.
210
Ficery, et al., The Synergy Enigma, note [] above (one should “define and identify revenue
synergies as the positive present value of the net cash flows that result from revenue increases.”).
211
Kengelbach, et al. (“Revenue synergies, on the other hand, are more difficult both to realize
and to quantify, depending as they do on the behavior of third parties such as customers.
Although concepts such as cross-selling, up-selling, and concentrating on the highest-margin
products and segments are conceptually easy to grasp, realizing them calls for exceptional
management and execution. As a result, analysts and investors tend to view revenue synergies
with great skepticism, preferring to believe in them only after they have come to fruition.
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The synergy-specific discounted cash flow approach that we suggest also makes perfect
theoretical sense. There are two reasons, however, why one could nevertheless question whether
this alternative approach represents any practical improvement over a full discounted cash flow
valuation of the subject/target firm. First, it is unclear whether or to what extent acquirers
actually engage in the exercise of preparing estimates of synergistic gains in a fashion that might
be useful to a synergy-specific discounted cash flow analysis. Many acquirers take the occasion,
upon announcement of a deal, to publicize estimates of gross synergies, but those
announcements are largely devoid of any period by period breakdowns of anticipated savings
and related costs.212
We nevertheless suspect that acquirers could, in litigation, present such breakdowns –
after all, the public disclosures of gross synergistic gains are presumably premised on more
granular estimates of such gains. With renewed attention on the part of the Delaware courts to
the issue of a deduction for synergies, the parties are now incentivized to prepare this
information and present it in litigation. Indeed, we predict that such attention and incentives may
generate an outpouring of evidence bearing on synergy estimates. The treatment of synergies in
finance literature, largely neglected today, may become a prime target of finance-based research.
Acquirers, by the same token, tend to downplay talk of revenue synergies during deal
negotiations to avoid the risk that the seller will demand a share of synergies that ultimately may
not materialize.”); Ficery, et al., The Synergy Enigma, note [] above (“Revenue synergies are
especially controversial, because they are often difficult to calculate and capture, and are also
often overvalued.”).
212
See, e.g., “AT&T to Acquire Time Warner,” AT&T Press Release (Oct. 22, 2016), available
at http://about.att.com/story/att_to_acquire_time_warner.html (“AT&T expects $1 billion in
annual run rate cost synergies within 3 years of the deal closing. The expected cost synergies are
primarily driven by corporate and procurement expenditures. In addition, over time, AT&T
expects to achieve incremental revenue opportunities that neither company could obtain on a
standalone basis.”); Qualcomm press release, “Qualcomm to Acquire NXP,” (Oct. 27, 2016),
available at https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2016/10/27/qualcomm-acquire-nxp
(“Qualcomm expects to generate $500 million of annualized run-rate cost synergies within two
years after the transaction closes.”).
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We note that appraisal litigants only started using sophisticated DCF-based analyses after
Weinberger required that the best techniques of finance be used to support appraisal awards.213
Similarly, the use of fairness opinions from investment bankers became a typical part of deal
documents only after Smith v. Van Gorkom implied that such documents might be useful for
directors in fulfilling their fiduciary duties.214
A second reason for questioning the synergy-specific DCF analysis we advocate,
however, is that it uses many of the same highly contestable inputs (e.g., beta, equity risk
premium) that are employed in a target firm-only discounted cash flow valuation. Our response
is simply that in evaluating anticipated synergistic gains, as opposed to whole-firm cash flows,
one is likely to be applying the contestable inputs to a much smaller amount of future cash flows
than the cash flows associated with the target firm as a whole. As a result, the same variability of
inputs should have a smaller cumulative effect on valuation contentions, where only the value of
synergies is contested. The small effect is only a partial consolation, especially since the
optimism or pessimism of the competing expert stories may make the percentage effect even
larger, particularly if and when the serious subtraction of synergies enters case law.
2.

Estimating the Allocation of Synergies to the Target

Even if the total present value of synergies expected to arise from the merger could be
estimated with great confidence, it could not necessarily be deducted in full from the deal price
to arrive at the fair value of the target firm; to do so inflexibly would in effect assume that none
of that synergy value is retained by the acquiring firm. Thus, for example, if the acquiring firm
anticipated $10 million in anticipated synergies and shared $4 million of that value with target
213

457 A.2d at 713.
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Jacob J. Fedechko, The Role of Judicial Opinions in Shaping
M&A Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Edward Elgar 2016),
at [ ].
214
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stockholders by including that amount in the deal price, that $4 million should be deducted from
the deal price in arriving at fair value. The question in any given appraisal proceeding, then, is to
determine the extent to which estimated synergies were allocated in the deal to target
stockholders and how much of that value was retained by the acquirer.
To say that the answer to this question is less than scientifically precise would be a
considerable understatement. To the best of our knowledge, the percentage allocation in any
given deal is not expressly articulated in the merger agreement or even in merger negotiations.215
The relatively sparse literature on this question, moreover, is inconsistent. Some advance the
view that synergistic merger gains almost exclusively benefit target shareholders, and acquiring
firms retain none of those gains.216 According to another study, which relied on post-deal
announcement call option price movements rather than stock price movements, acquirers and
target shareholders share such gains about equally.217 A more recent and detailed study reports
that the median percentage of synergy value received by target shareholders is 31%, although the
allocation varies by industry, with target shareholders in the telecommunications industry

215

The court in Aruba Networks acknowledged this measurement problem: “The parties agree
that it is not possible to determine with precision what portion of the final deal price reflects
synergy value. The respondent’s expert conceded that ‘[t]he percentage of synergies actually
paid by HP to Aruba cannot be accurately measured.’”). Id., slip op. at 102.
216
S.B. Moeller, F.P. Schlingemann & R.M. Stultz, Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A
Study of Acquiring Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757 (2004) (estimating
that acquiring firm stockholders lose 12 cents per acquisition dollar spent, indicating that on
average any merger synergy value (and more) is allocated to target stockholders); Michael
Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their
Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. OF FIN. ECON. 3, 31
(1988) (“target stockholders have captured the lion’s share of the [synergistic] gains from tender
offers, and their share of these gains has increased since the passage of the Williams Amendment
of 1968.”).
217
Kathryn Barraclough, et al., Using Option Prices to Infer Overpayments and Synergies in
M&A Transactions, 26 The Review of Financial Studies [] (2013).
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receiving 6% of synergy value and target shareholders in the health care industry receiving 51%
of synergy value.218
Other commentators indicate that the allocation of synergy gains in mergers may be
determined by factors in addition to industry type. For example, it has been suggested, plausibly,
that such gains are likely to be more fully shared with target stockholders as the number of
bidders and intensity of bidding competition increase.219 It has also been suggested that the
target’s shareholders will receive a greater share of synergistic merger gains if the target firm’s
contribution to those synergies is greater.220 In our analysis, however, a finding that a target firm
is entirely or largely responsible for the creation of a synergistic gain may well also lead to the
conclusion that the gain was an opportunity belonging to the target and, thus, part of its going
concern value.221 That conclusion in turn would dictate that in using deal price to determine fair
value, no deduction should be made on account of that gain.
3.

Judicial Evaluation of Synergy Claims

As reviewed above, judicial evaluation of synergy claims is in its infancy, and pertinent
authorities and financial expertise have yet to develop fully. One can imagine a more mature

218

Jens Kengelbach, Dennis Utzerath, & Cristoph Kaserer, How Successful M&A Deals Split the
Synergies, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP (Mar. 27, 2013), available at
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/mergers_acquisitions_postmerger_integration
_divide_conquer_deals_split_synergies/#chapter1. This study is as detailed in its conclusions as
it is lacking in transparency: the report does not reveal its methodology, and the data base is
described only as “636 deals with transaction values of over $300 from 2000 to 2011,” without
specification of industry or jurisdiction.
219
Bradley, et al., at 31; Kengelbach, et al. (“The amount of the seller’s share does not correlate
with M&A cycles—that is, it doesn’t rise during M&A-intensive periods and decline during lulls
in the cycle. It varies instead according to factors such as the relative negotiating strengths of the
buyer and seller and the amount of competition to acquire the target.”).
221

See part III.B above, addressing how to identify synergies that are appropriately considered in
arriving at a deduction from deal price to determine fair value.
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system for such evaluation, however, applying principles already developed in appraisal
litigation:
•

Just as expert testimony on discounted cash flow analysis has been widely presented and
accepted as a tool for valuation of firms in appraisal litigation, one can expect that
synergy valuation will be an appropriate subject for expert testimony, at least where the
proffered valuation techniques are reasonably familiar to the financial community.222

•

Just as cash flow projections are more readily accepted where they are prepared by
management in the ordinary course of business, and not strictly for purposes of
litigation,223 synergy projections are likely to be more persuasive where they are
generated as part of a merger integration planning process, where there is at least some
incentive for presenting estimates that are sustainable, rather than purely for litigation
purposes. Unmoored from the operational integration planning process, synergy estimates
may be subject to upward bias on account of an interest on the part of the acquirer in
persuading the market (including its own investors) that the acquisition is beneficial.224

222

Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (endorsing the use of “generally
accepted [valuation] techniques used in the financial community and the courts”). Referring to
the context of appraisal in connection with controller freeze-outs, Coates expressed a similar
hope that financial and litigation practice would develop techniques for assessing synergies.
Coates, note [ ] above, 147 U. PA. L. REV. at 1352 (“Practitioners would develop and refine
techniques for arriving at appropriate adjustments, and a body of case law would develop to
assist practitioners in this process.”).
223
See, e.g., ACP Master, Ltd. v. Clearwire Corp., 2017 WL 3105858, at *31 (Del. Ch. July 21,
2017) (“The first key to a reliable DCF analysis is the availability of reliable projections of future
expected cash flows, preferably derived from contemporaneous management projections
prepared in the ordinary course of business.”) (quoting In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599,
at *32 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017)).
224
See Peter Welsh, et al., Management Projections in Delaware Appraisal Litigation:
Anecdotal Evidence, note [] above, at 17 (“Existing literature suggests that management’s
financial forecasts often exhibit upward biases.”, citing David S. Koo & P. Eric Yeung,
Managers’ Forecasts of Long-Term Growth in Earnings: New Information or Cheap Talk? at 3
(Working Paper) available at
66

2/26/18
•

Because it would be the acquirer (as or through the surviving corporation) that would be
urging a deduction from deal price to account for synergies, and because it is the acquirer
that should be expected to have, or have access to, evidence of the extent and allocation
of such synergies, any significant weakness in the evidence should, to the extent of such
weakness, result in a refusal by the court to give effect to the requested discount from
deal price.225 Put another way, where acquirers are aware of the potential for appraisal
litigation in which the target’s share of synergies is to be deducted from the deal price in
measuring fair value, a failure on their part to generate reasonably supported specific
synergy estimates in the course of merger planning should counsel against accepting
claims for a deduction from deal price based on estimates of synergies generated solely
for purposes of litigation.

•

As suggested in one recent case, the court’s choice of estimate of how synergies were
shared may be guided by its judgment about the quality of the bargaining by the target’s

http://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/Eric%20Yeung.pdf, and
Christopher S. Armstrong, et. al., Biases in multi-year management financial forecasts: Evidence
from private venture-backed U.S. companies, 12 REV. OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES 183 (2007)).
225
E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 878 (Del. 1985) (“the production of weak evidence
when strong is, or should have been, available can lead only to the conclusion that the strong
would have been adverse.”); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939)
(“The production of weak evidence when strong is available can lead only to the conclusion that
the strong would have been adverse.”). Where a controller stockholder is relying on evidence
from comparable transactions and contending for a deduction from deal prices based on
synergies, burdens of proof associated with the entire fairness doctrine provide a further basis for
rejecting such deductions where the evidence for such deductions is weak or non-existent. See
Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 221-222 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“Given
the paucity of synergy-related evidence for which [the controlling stockholder] was responsible,
the Vice Chancellor coped admirably with the evidence that was presented, and reached a
reasonable valuation using the analytical tools and evidence that were available to him.”). See
also Coates, note [] above, 147 U. PA. L. REV. at 1352 (asserting that “traditional Delaware law
in entire fairness litigation that places the burden of proving entire fairness on the transaction
sponsors … would permit control persons, at a minimum, to exclude the impact of synergy value
if they could propose a reliable estimate of such synergies.”).
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representatives: a perception that bargaining was relatively weak may imply that the
target’s stockholders received a relatively smaller share of overall synergies, and vice
versa.226
•

Finally, the courts would likely be assisted in their evaluation of synergies by continued
use of discounted cash flow valuation of the standalone target firm. In theory, that
valuation should yield a result equal to the difference between the deal price and the
value of synergies shared with target stockholders. Accordingly, where the latter formula
is used to determine fair value (where the deal process is adequate), DCF analysis may be
a check on the plausibility of contentions about the extent of synergies being deducted
from the deal price, and the efficacy of the deal process.227

IV.

CONCLUSION
In the wake of judicial decisions emphasizing reliance on the deal price to determine fair

value, it remains to be seen whether appraisal arbitrage will continue to be as rewarding and as
common a practice as it has been in recent years. But we see no reason why the legal validity of
the practice will or should be eliminated, and we believe that it should remain as a mechanism to
make the appraisal remedy viable where the remedy can serve as a check on self-serving
opportunism or even a disinterested failure to conduct a reasonable sale process.

226

Aruba Networks, slip op. at 104-105 (“Because I am inclined to think that Aruba’s
representatives bargained less effectively than they might have, I tend to think that they obtained
a relatively low share of the synergies from HP.”).
227
In several instances the courts have found a DCF analysis helpful in corroborating their
reliance on the deal price in determining fair value. E.g., Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 189, at *89 (“The proximity between th[e] outcome [of the court’s DCF analysis] and the
result of the sale process is comforting.”); Ancestry.com, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, at *23 (the
fact that DCF analysis yielded a value reasonably close to the deal price gave the court “comfort
that no undetected factor skewed the sales process”).
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On the other hand, we concur with the legal premise, articulated by the Delaware
Supreme Court in DFC and Dell, that fair value in appraisal proceedings should not be found to
exceed the result of a sale process that is disinterested and reasonable. We further submit that the
Delaware courts have developed and applied a standard that can appropriately be used to
determine when a sale process has been reasonable: namely, the standard of enhanced scrutiny,
for reasonableness, as formulated and used in the courts’ Revlon jurisprudence.228 Application of
that standard would avoid concerns that a presumption in favor of using the deal price to
establish fair value (a “market price rule”) would eliminate bidders’ incentives to pay
appropriately high prices: a bidder seeking to take advantage of a conflicted or inadequate sale
process would not be able to presume that its exposure in appraisal litigation would be limited to
the deal price (plus prejudgment interest); to the contrary, the bidder (the real party in interest in
appraisal litigation) would be required to bear the initial burden of establishing that the sale
process was unconflicted and fell within at least a range of reasonableness. That approach,
coupled with a viable prospect of appraisal arbitrage, would give bidders for public companies
an incentive to avoid demands for unreasonably accelerated bidding deadlines or unusually
stringent deal protections, at least without being satisfied that the target company has engaged in
a robust pre-signing market check.

228

Absent faithful implementation of the special committee and majority of the minority vote
protections specified in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014), that
standard would certainly not apply in the case of a freezeout merger effected by a controlling
stockholder. In that situation, therefore, we would not expect the court to rely on the merger
price to measure fair value. Although the court in that situation might take into account the price
that might be achieved in a hypothetical sale to a third party (Cornfields, note [ ] above, 31 J.
CORP. L. at 151-152), that hypothetical price lacks the legitimizing imprimatur of actual market
behavior, and would presumably not be entitled to the sort of deference contemplated by the
Delaware Supreme Court’s recent opinions in DFC and Dell.
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If the Delaware courts continue to rely on the deal price to measure fair value in
appropriate cases, they will increasingly be required to implement the settled legal mandate that
merger gains that are solely attributable to the merger and that are included in the deal price must
be deducted from that price in order to arrive at fair value. The case law and the finance literature
addressing how such a deduction should be determined are sparse. Our intuition is that the craft
of responsibly estimating such a deduction – by estimating overall merger gains and estimating
how much of them are shared with target stockholders through the deal price – will become more
refined, just as the courts’ treatment of discounted cash flow analysis became more refined with
experience after its initial acceptance in Weinberger v. UOP. We expect in this regard that
bidders will develop more detailed evidence of anticipated synergies, and that if they do so in the
context of evaluating their bids and preparing to implement post-merger business plans, the
courts will be more inclined to accept such evidence than would be the case with synergy
estimates prepared solely for litigation purposes.
Even with these refinements of the appraisal remedy, the courts’ well-developed
familiarity with the ins and outs of discounted cash flow analysis will not become obsolete. Most
obviously, that valuation technique will continue to be the primary guide to determining fair
value in cases in which the deal price cannot be relied upon.229 And even in cases where the deal
price can be advocated as the appropriate valuation determinant, courts are likely to continue to
be guided by discounted cash flow valuations, if only to help evaluate the plausibility of
contentions that the deal process was reasonable and that proposed synergy deductions are
appropriate.

229

This is precisely the approach adopted by the Court of Chancery in its recent opinion in AOL.
Id., slip op. at 24 (where deal price was found to be insufficiently reliable to measure fair value,
“a discounted cash flow analysis is the best way to value the Company.”).
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APPENDIX*
Case

Year Conflict?

Deal Price

Fair Value

% diff.

Straight Arrow Publishers
Allenson v. Midway Airlines

1998
2001

No
No

$100.00
$0.01

$262.96
$0.01

97%
0%

Cytokine Pharmasciences
Union Financial Group
American Specialty Retailing
Montgomery Cellular Holding
MedPointe Healthcare, Inc.
JRC Acquisition Corp.
Emerging Communications
Cancer Treatment Centers
Coleman Co., Inc.
Gholl v. eMachines
US Cellular (Janesville)
US Cellular (Sheboygan)
Andaloro v. PFPC
In re PNB Holding Co.
Gesoff v. IIC Industries
Delaware Open MRI v. Kessler
Dr. Pepper Bottling Co.
AXA Financial
In re Appraisal of Metromedia
Hanover Direct
Global GT v. Golden Telecom
Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc.
In re Orchard Enterprises
American Commercial Lines
Merion Capital v. 3M Cogent
Huff Fund v. CKx.
Towerview LLC v. Cox Radio
3M Cogent
Laidler v. Hesco
Ancestry
LongPath Capital v. Ramtron
Merlin Partners LP v. Autoinfo
Merion Capital v. BMC
Owen v. Cannon
AutoInfo
DFC Global Corp
Dell
Dunmire v. F&M
Lender Processing

2002
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2009
2010
2010
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2014
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2016
2016
2016
2016

Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

N/A
$8.74
$2,200.00
$8,102.23
$20.44
$13.00
$10.25
$260.00
$9.31
$1.06
$43.85
$21.45
$34.26
$41.00
$10.50
$16,228.55
$25.00
$31.00
$9.52
$0.25
$105.00
$40,000,000
$2.05
$33.00
$10.50
$5.50
$4.80
$10.50
$207.50
$32.00
$3.10
$1.05
$46.25
$19.95
$1.05
$9.50
$13.75
$83.00
$37.14

$1,114
$8.74
$9,079.43
$19,621.74
$24.45
$13.58
$44.95
$1,345.00
$32.35
$1.64
$54.00
$30.13
$32.81
$52.34
$14.30
$33,232.26
$32.31
$24.97
$38.92
$0.25
$125.49
$34,244,576
$4.67
$38.16
$10.87
$5.50
$5.75
$10.87
$364.24
$32.00
$3.07
$1.05
$46.25
$31.94
$1.05
$10.21
$17.62
$91.90
$37.14

N/A
0%
142%
88%
18%
4%
148%
164%
125%
44%
21%
34%
-4%
24%
31%
72%
26%
-22%
141%
0%
18%
-16%
82%
15%
3%
0%
18%
3%
56%
0%
-1%
0%
0%
47%
0%
7%
25%
10%
0%
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In re Petsmart
In re SWS Group
Clearwire
Aruba Networks
AOL

2017
2017
2017
2018
2018

No
No
Yes
No
No

$83.00
$6.92
$5.00
$24.37
$50.00

$83.00
$6.38
$2.13
$17.12
$48.70

0%
-8%
-85%
-35%
-3%

__________________
* This Appendix lists Delaware appraisal cases since 1997, and recites for each such case the
deal price, the fair value established by the court, and the percentage difference between those
two figures (specifically, the log of the court’s fair value determination minus the log of the deal
price). The entry under the heading “Conflict?” denotes whether the underlying transaction was
an “interested transaction” as defined in Model Business Corporation Act § 13.01. In recent
cases (Dell, for example), the fair value judgment of the Court of Chancery specified in this
Appendix may not be final (i.e., may be subject to appeal or revision on remand).
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